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The present study treats Polish-American bilateral relations in the past and present, with 
special concern for contemporary themes of armaments.  This work seizes upon the 
author’s experience in the U.S. Embassy, Warsaw, as well as scholarly analysis. Together 
with NATO allies, the United States has begun the fielding of an anti-missile system 
directed against Iran. By dint of policy and geography, the Republic of Poland’s status as 
one of closest allies to the United States put it at the forefront of the candidates to host the 
interceptor portion of the system.  In addition to the U.S. anti-missile installation, the 
Polish government wants significant U.S. forces stationed in Poland as a symbol of 
collective defense.  As in other cases of the politics of forward defense in NATO in the 
past and present, the Poles desire an unshakable commitment to forward defense at a time 
of strategic retrenchment and shifts in the international system.  
The modifications of the plans for the proposed bases as a result of policy, 
strategy and budgets were caused by changes of leadership in both the U.S. and Poland; 
further, such change has arisen about U.S. concerns from Russia and other European 
countries, to say nothing of the global economic crisis that drastically reduced the ability 
of the United States and its allies to maintain a defense effort in the face of sharp 
austerity.  
 vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION................................................................1 
B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES ...............................................................3 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................4 
D. METHODS AND SOURCES .........................................................................7 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW .....................................................................................8 
II. POLISH SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY: THE ROLES OF THE 
UNITED STATES AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY 
ORGANIZATION. ......................................................................................................9 
A. POLISH SECURITY AND DEFENSE HISTORY ......................................9 
1. HISTORICAL ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES .......................10 
2. POLAND AND NATO ......................................................................11 
III. FOREIGN MILITARY BASES IN POLISH HISTORY. .....................................15 
A. HISTORY OF OCCUPATION OF POLAND ............................................15 
1. EARLY PERIOD ...............................................................................15 
2. POST WORLD WAR II PERIOD ...................................................17 
3. POST COMMUNIST PERIOD ........................................................19 
4. THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN MILITARY PRESENCE IN 
POLAND .............................................................................................21 
IV. U.S. BASES IN EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE, HISTORY, BASIC ISSUES 
AND POLICY, AND FUTURE. ...............................................................................23 
A. HISTORY OF UNITED STATES OVERSEAS MILITARY BASES .....23 
1. THE BEGINNING OF OVERSEAS PRESENCE .........................23 
2. POST WORLD WAR II ERA OF U.S. MILITARY 
PRESENCE ABROAD ......................................................................24 
3. THE CONTEMPORARY DILEMMA OF U.S. OVERSEAS 
PRESENCE ........................................................................................26 
4. THE IMPACT OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS .....................27 
5. THE MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM ..............................................28 
V. POLISH DEFENSE POLICIES AND BASES........................................................29 
A. THE MODERN HISTORY OF POLISH NATIONAL SECURITY 
POLICY ..........................................................................................................29 
1. THE CONSTITUTION OF POLAND.............................................30 
2. THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF POLAND .........32 
3. THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF POLAND ............33 
4. CONTEMPORARY ISSUES OF THE NATIONAL 
SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY IN POLAND ....................35 
5. THE POLISH STRATEGIC DEFENSE REVIEW .......................36 
B. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................41 
 viii 
VI. CONTEMPORARY ISSUES OF POLISH-U.S. DEFENSE AFFAIRS AND 
BASES. ........................................................................................................................42 
A. POLITICS OF MISSILE DEFENSE ...........................................................42 
1. THE BUSH-ERA PLANS .................................................................42 
2. OBAMA-ERA PLANS ......................................................................43 
3. THE RUSSIAN POSITION ..............................................................46 
B. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................47 
VII. CONTEMPORARY ISSUES OF POLISH-U.S. RELATIONSHIP .....................49 
A. CONTEMPORARY HISTORY OF POLISH-U.S. RELATIONS ...........49 
B. DETERIORATING RELATIONSHIP .......................................................50 
1. POLICY ..............................................................................................51 
2. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ....................................................................51 
3. OPEN LETTER TO PRESIDENT OBAMA ..................................53 
4. THE IMPROVEMENT OF POLISH-AMERICAN 
RELATIONS AND THE WAY FORWARD ..................................54 
VIII. DEFENSE EFFORTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES 
DURING GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS AND AUSTERITY. ..........................55 
A. ECONOMIC CRISIS AND NATO ..............................................................55 
B. ECONOMIC CRISIS AND U.S. POLICY ON MISSILE DEFENSE ......56 
C. BURDEN SHARING IN TIMES OF AUSTERITY ...................................58 
D. CONCLUSION .............................. ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. 
IX. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................60 
A. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................60 
1. INITIAL PLANS ................................................................................60 
2. THE NEW PLAN ...............................................................................61 
3. POLICY AND POLITICS ................................................................61 
4. REACTION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ..........................62 
5. THE WAY FORWARD ....................................................................62 
APPENDIX ............................................................. ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. 
LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................65 




LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
BBN  Biuro Bespieczenstwa Narodowego [Polish National Security Bureau] 
BMD  Ballistic Missile Defense 
BMDS  Ballistic Missile Defense System 
CEE  Central and Eastern Europe 
DoD  Department of Defense 
EPAA  European Phased Adaptive Approach 
GMD  Ground-based Mid-course Defense 
GDPR    Global Defense Posture Review 
ICBM  Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles  
MDS  Missile Defense System 
MON  Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej [Polish Ministry of National Defense] 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
PAP  Polska Agencja Prasowa [Polish Press Agency] 
PfP  Partnership for Peace 
PiS  Prawo I Sprawiedliwosc [Truth and Justice – Polish populist-nationalist  
  political party] 
PO  Platforma Obywatelska [Civic Alliance-Polish (two) political party  
  coalition] 
SDR  Strategic Defense Review 
WP  Wojsko Polskie [Polish Armed Forces]  
 x 




“Without freedom of choice there is no creativity.”*  The Naval Postgraduate 
School allows us this freedom, and therefore awakens our creativity.  This, in turn, 
transforms us and enriches us allowing us to share our knowledge and experiences with 
each other, for “the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.”** 
I owe a great deal of gratitude to my advisors, Professor Donald Abenheim and 
Professor Mikhail Tsypkin.  Their mentorship and guidance were instrumental 
throughout the thesis process and without their support I would have not succeeded.   
I would also like to thank my classmates for their help in achieving this milestone 
as well as for sharing their experiences and knowledge and broadening my scholastic 
horizons. 
To my friend, Major John Szczepanski, I owe a deep debt of gratitude for his 
support in this academic endeavor.  Your friendship and encouragement were 
instrumental in the improvement of my communication abilities. 
I am grateful that my parents, Krystyna and Tadeusz, always encouraged my 
professional and personal education and for giving me the solid educational foundation 
which was instrumental in all of my academic achievements. 
I also want to thank my amazing wife, Anna, and two wonderful daughters, Leah 
and Olivia, for supporting me during this difficult task and for being my guiding star and 
keeping my course true!  This thesis is our achievement and it would not be possible 
without you in my life.  I love you all very much. 
Finally, I would like to thank the United States Navy and the Foreign Area 
Officer Program for giving me this amazing opportunity and the honor of studying at the 
Naval Postgraduate School.  
 
____________________________________ 
        * Captain Kirk, "The return of the Archons", stardate 3157.4, http://iheartquotes.com/tags/kirk?page=2 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The present study embodies a case study of bilateral security and defense relations 
between the U.S. and one of its leading European allies.  The work assesses the 
intersection of domestic politics, the international system, armaments, and trans-Atlantic 
relations influx during the past decade and a half.  How did the ongoing negotiations for 
deployment of the U.S. missile defense system (MDS) and military personnel, and the 
creation of military bases in the Republic of Poland affect the politics and policies of 
Poland and its neighbors?  Did the agreement and following reversals of the decision to 
place American military assets, including MDS, cause any policy changes in Poland, and 
was there any political fallout associated with the two reversals by the U.S.?  What were 
political, diplomatic and policy consequences of this chain of events over the past four 
years?  
How did Poland’s eastern neighbor, the Russian Federation, react to the 
agreement and subsequent ratification of the plans for MDS and other U.S. military 
installations in Poland?  What were the policy changes and reactions to the U.S.-Poland 
agreement?  How did the U.S. and NATO try to approach the possible discontent of 
Russia that resulted from proposed MDS and American military installations so close to 
Russian soil?   
What were the results of the shifting U.S. position about the deployment of MDS 
and American servicemen and women on the territory of Poland?  How did the Polish 
leadership and general population react to these changes and what were perceived reasons 
for the reversal of this decision?  What are the current trends in the U.S.-Poland 
relationship? 
Is the relationship between Poland and the United States as strong as it was at the 
beginning of the century, before the idea of MDS and U.S. bases in Poland was 
introduced?  What events affected this relationship the most, and were they positive or 
negative in nature?  What is the future direction of these two longtime allies?  Will the 
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MDS and U.S. military presence solidify the relationship, or will it cause a rupture 
between the United States and Poland? 
How did the unforeseen complications caused by the global economic crisis affect 
the projects of MDS and American military bases in Poland?  Is the future of the missile 
defense and U.S. presence in Poland in question?   
This thesis will explore the political and policy implications in various realms 
created by the proposed MDS and reinforced and deepened by U.S. military basing plans 
in Poland in the immediate past and present. In addition, it will examine the Polish-
American relationship in the past and present, and identify the latest trends caused by 
proposed U.S. bases and other interactions between these long-time allies.  Finally, the 
regional aspects of the proposed permanent American presence in Poland will be 
examined to include both political and military implications of the MDS and 
conventional bases. 
Outstanding in connection with the fate of Poland in the cosmos of U.S. defense 
interests is the theme of missile defense; anti-missile missiles are but a sub-theme in the 
grander question of trans-Atlantic defense relations and geopolitics in central Europe and 
beyond. As the global security situation deteriorates and more possible problems and 
challenges loom in the near future, the importance of national security and protection of 
the continental United States against threats from intercontinental ballistic missile with 
nuclear, chemical, or biological payload become a primary concern.  The MDS will be 
the primary means of defense against this threat.  The technical aspects of this system are 
being finalized, and tests assessing its effectiveness are currently being conducted by the 
United States military.  Technical obstacles, which can be overcome with modifications 
and improvements of equipment, are only a portion of problems facing this project.  
Diplomatic agreements securing the optimal placement of this defensive weapons system 
were finalized in 2008, providing for placement of U.S. military bases in central and 
Eastern Europe.  This thesis will address the impact of such a proposed military 
installation in the Republic of Poland.  Despite the assurances of the U.S. government 
about the benefits of this system and its purely defensive capabilities, many politicians 
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and citizens of Poland question the need for U.S. bases in their country.  The politics of 
such bases in Polish domestic and international debate, as well as that of the United 
States amid a reorientation to Asian security, provide a fertile area for inquiry, as does an 
analysis of leading Polish parties, press, and National Security documents concerned with 
national defense.  
B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
U.S. military bases around the world are a hot topic both domestically and 
internationally.  The very existence of such installations is interpreted, by many, as 
American expansionism and colonialism.  These arguments are being perpetuated by 
foreign organizations and governments, as well as domestic non-government 
organizations and many politicians alike.  Additionally, the global financial crisis is 
forcing the U.S. government and military to evaluate the cost and justification for 
overseas bases.   
 Given the current situation and attitudes toward overseas bases, the plans for 
creating additional installations abroad, such as the base in Poland that will be a primary 
installation for the Missile Defense System, are even more questionable at this time.  The 
greatest justification for this project is the threat of intercontinental ballistic missiles, with 
nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads, capable of striking the continental United 
States or Europe from a hostile nation or terrorist organization in the Middle East or Asia.  
As states such as Iran and North Korea attest, either in possession or close to 
development of such a weapon, the necessity is evident for a viable defense against this 
type of threat becomes a priority in the realm of national defense.   
Additionally, the concerns of our longtime ally and partner, the Republic of 
Poland, regarding its own defense and ability to stand up to the potential threat from its 
eastern neighbors creates a need, as described by Polish military and civilian leadership, 
for a continuous presence of U.S. military personnel in Poland.  This presence will 
generate additional security assurance for Poland, and by its very existence, create a 
deterrent to those who might want to challenge its sovereignty.   
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Polish position toward the proposed U.S. military bases is mostly positive on 
the political and military level but somewhat mixed among its population.  As a fairly 
new member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Poland is eager to participate in 
projects, exercises, and military actions alongside its new allies, especially the United 
States.  The question of the Missile Defense System and the required facilities on the 
territory of Poland became a hot topic between Poland, NATO, the United States, 
European Union, Russia, and China.  The biggest point of contention on the subject exists 
between the Unites States and Poland, and its one time Cold War adversary, Russia.  In 
addition, Poland’s history of Soviet occupation and the existence of Red Army military 
bases in the past brings about caution and suspicion among many Poles.   
Additionally, the current economic crisis in the United States and in other regions 
of the world is forcing American policy makers to re-evaluate foreign basing policies and 
priorities. Many argue that the current number of overseas bases is financially 
unsustainable, while others add that it is harming America’s image, associating it with 
former imperialist regimes and empires.   
In his book “Occupation in the Name of Alliance. The Red Army in Poland 1944-
1956,”1 Mariusz Krogulski describes previously unknown details of secret agreements 
between the Soviet Union and Communist Poland; despicable acts of Russian officers 
and troops, and their contribution to the creation of Communist system in Poland; and the 
elimination of any existing opposition.  He describes the abuse and exploitation of Poland 
and its citizens by the alleged ally.  His books cover the time period ending in 1993, the 
year in which Soviet military forces left Poland, presenting complete picture of the 
occupation and its socio-political consequences. 
     In contrast, the books describing the U.S. military overseas base system are 
concentrated on the national security aspect of the external presence of American military 
forces as well as the nature of this presence.  The initial reasons for the overseas bases 
                                                 
1 Mariusz Krogulski, Okupacja w imię sojuszu. Armia Radziecka w Polsce 1956–1993 (Wydawnictwo 
von borowiecky, 2001)  
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and evolving motives for the continuous presence are being studied by many authors and 
scholars in the fields of national security and international relations. Finally, the societal 
aspects and public reactions to the continuous post of U.S. military personnel in their 
countries are examined, and an attempt to predict the future of U.S. overseas basing 
policies is made.   
“United States Overseas Basing: An Anatomy of the Dilemma,”2 by James R. 
Blaker, describes a brief history and overview of the current basing system.  Next Blake 
examines, in detail, the framework of the system and argues that in the future, the 
importance of the individual base and its location, as pertaining to national security, will 
diminish and the efficiency of those bases and the ability of this network to deploy and 
use the military forces will be the most important aspect of the system.  He also tries to 
address possible changes in the future due to advancements in technology, changing geo-
political situation, financial constraints, and other circumstances, but in the end, 
advocates that in the foreseeable future we will need and use the overseas bases in order 
to project power and protect national interests. 
C. T. Sandars, in his book “America’s Overseas Garrison: The Leasehold 
Empire,”3 introduces the idea of the leasehold empire as an American substitution for a 
traditional colonial empire.  He addresses the political and social problems as well as the 
negative image the current overseas base system creates.  The negotiations and 
agreements between the United States and the host countries are the staple of this 
leasehold empire, and detailed description of those bilateral arrangements is presented.  
The invitational status of the U.S. military forces is in his opinion the main differentiator 
between colonialism and the American overseas presence.  Sandars also mentions that the 
increasing demands for the foreign aid, which the U.S. government does not consider 
“rent” for the above mentioned facilities by the host countries, may jeopardize the future 
                                                 
2 James R. Blaker, United States Overseas Basing: An Anatomy of the Dilemma (Praeger Publishers, 
1990) 
3 Christopher T. Sandars, Americas Overseas Garrisons: The Leasehold Empire (Oxford University 
Press Inc.., 2000) 
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existence of those installations.  He also discusses the strategic utility of various U.S. 
bases around the world. 
In his book “Base Politics – Democratic Change and the U.S. Military 
Overseas,”4 Alexander Cooley took a more scientific approach to the United States’ 
global presence.  He examined the overall causes for support, indifference, or expulsion 
of American military bases overseas since World War II.  He showed a major correlation 
between the type of a regime in a country and its relationship toward the U.S. military 
presence on its territory.  Emphasis was placed on internal political situations and 
transitional political systems as well as the element of unpredictability in the base 
policies of the host nations.  He addresses another major factor affecting the U.S. basing 
around the world, which is the overall image of America and its international policies.  
This issue can be directly linked to the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
Historically, this is similar to other conflicts involving the United States.  According to 
Cooley this was, is, and will be one of the issues the United States will not have much 
control over since all military conflicts have a negative stigma attached to them.  In 
closing, he discussed the existing policies of the United States toward host countries and 
addressed the need for reforms of the American overseas military base policy in 
correlation with Global Defense Posture Review (GDPR).  The new approach he suggests 
would decrease the physical footprint of new bases while updating their location to 
reflect the new military and political centers of gravity around the world.  This new kind 
of base would emphasize bilateral security relations and possibly include an economic 
stimulus in addition to increased military cooperation.   
The official government document pertaining to national security and military 
establishment will be examined for any changes in policy or defense trends caused by the 
announcement of the intentions of creation of missile defense site and U.S. military bases 
in Poland and subsequent two reversals of the decision. 
                                                 
4 Alexander Cooley, Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas (Cornell 
University Press 2008) 
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Various reports, studies, and press articles from the United States, the Republic of 
Poland and the region will present political positions, public opinions, future options, and 
other aspects of the politics and policies related to the establishment of permanent U.S. 
military bases in Poland and following decisions to abandon the project, and one more 
reversals of official position.  Subjects such as the enhancement of the Polish military, 
size and type of the U.S. footprint, Status of Forces Agreement, and Missile Defense 
System, as well as political impact of such endeavor on the relationship with Russia and 
other countries in the region will be investigated and presented.  
D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis will review the historical and current information available in official 
Polish documents, books, studies, and press in order to form a clear and concise view of 
the past and present attitudes toward foreign bases on the territory of Poland.  
Additionally, the author will analyze the bilateral relationship between Poland and the 
United States since the end of the Cold War with emphasis on the period since the 
announcement of the intensions of the creation of U.S. military bases in Poland.   
Government documents pertaining to the national security, defense strategy, and 
other related subjects will be examined for changes or additions related to the U.S.-
Poland agreement’s about the MDS and American military presence in Poland. 
This thesis will also examine the impact of the announcement of the agreement 
between the Polish government and the U.S. government creating the base in Poland 
which will house the Missile Defense System.  Special attention will be given to Polish-
Russian and U.S.-Russian relations since the aforementioned agreement was signed and 
ratified by both the U.S. and the Republic of Poland.   
The present study emerges from this writer’s recent service in U.S. Embassy, 
Warsaw as well as in the interest of strategic studies focused on salient issues of policy 
germane to Polish-U.S. relations, which in the year 2012 have lost some of the shine that 
adhered to them just a few years ago.   
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E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is organized into nine chapters which examine the history of American 
overseas bases, foreign military presence on territory of Poland, contemporary issues 
associated with proposed presence of U.S. military in Poland as well as politics and 
policy implication of such presence.  The regional implications with emphasis on Poland-
Russia and U.S.-Russia relations as well as the position of NATO will be examined.  The 
complications arising from the global economic crisis and the impact will be addressed in 
later chapter.  Chapter IX offers the conclusion. 
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II. POLISH SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY: THE ROLES 
OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY 
ORGANIZATION  
A. POLISH SECURITY AND DEFENSE HISTORY 
The Republic of Poland in the 21st century signifies a venerable   nation with 
vibrant and turbulent history.  Its location and geography have made it a battleground 
between Western Europe and the Eastern lands the latter of which open to the steppes of 
Asia.    Poland also forms a major gateway between East and West.  Considered the most 
powerful nation in Europe before the 17th century, Poland halted the invasions of Tartars, 
Turks, Swedes, and many other invaders and protected the western portions of the 
continent, for instance at the Ottoman siege of Vienna in 1683.  However, after internal 
disputes and turmoil as the European dynasties reorganized in the 17th and 18th 
centuries, this great country “…disappeared from the map of Europe in 1795…”5 only to 
be reborn after the World War I.  The rebirth of Poland has been fostered first by the 
Germans against the Romanovs and then, in turn,  by the U.S. President, Woodrow 
Wilson, and his Fourteen Points mandate which stipulated that: “An independent Polish 
state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably 
Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and 
whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed 
by international covenant.”6  After its short-lived existence in the years 1918-1939, 
Poland once more fell victim to the machinations of its powerful neighbors.  The German 
and Soviet occupation of Poland in the years 1939-1945 was one of the most brutal and 
horrific in Europe.  Millions of Poles lost their lives, targeting the extermination of Polish 
intelligentsia, military, and all of the highly educated population as well as the nation’s 
Jews.  This episode in Polish history left a lasting scar of mistrust toward Germany and 
Russia.  Furthermore, the creation of Communist government after WW II by the Soviet 
                                                 
5Jeffrey Simon, Poland and NATO: A Study in Civil-Military Relations (Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers 2004), 4.  
6 Mieczyslaw B. Biskupski, The History of Poland, (Greenwood Press 2000), 49. 
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authorities and continued elimination of the “undesirable” Polish upper and middle class, 
created additional resentment toward Poland’s eastern neighbor.  All of these events 
created a high emphasis on security and national independence among the Polish 
population and government. 
1. HISTORICAL ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES 
The relationship between the United States and Poland has always been   a 
positive one because of the international system and immigration.  Americans, just like 
Poles, were under the oppression of a foreign power and fought against overwhelming 
odds to secure their independence.  Polish national heroes like General Tadeusz 
Kosciuszko and General Kazimierz Pulaski joined the Revolutionary war of 1776 and 
fought valiantly, ensuring the creation of the United States of America.  Additionally, the 
ideal of democratic government and constitution was equally strong among those nations 
and their populations.  As the situation in Europe, and especially in Poland, deteriorated 
in the 19th century the Polish citizens begun to emigrate en-mas to the newly formed 
United States, becoming one of the largest ethnic groups in the U.S.  The addition of 
President Wilson’s mandate to create Poland cemented the status of the two nations as 
partners, friends, and allies.  Even the Cold War did not change this view among the 
populations of both countries, despite the official position as enemies on two different 
sides of the Iron Curtain.  “Many Poles perceived the system imposed by the Soviet 
Union and led by the Polish Communist government since World War II as contrary to 
the interests of Poland and its citizens.”7  This special relationship between the peoples of 
Poland and the United States became truly evident after the fall of communism and 
Soviet Russia in the 1989-1991 time period and the subsequent inclusion of Poland, 
under the strong U.S. patronage, into NATO.  Since then, Poland has been a strong 
supporter of the United Stated and its foreign policy, even against some of its neighbors 
and partners in European Union; it supported the Operation Iraqi Freedom and 
                                                 
7 Jeffrey Simon, Poland and NATO: A Study in Civil-Military Relations (Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers 2004), 7. 
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contributed its military to the “Coalition of Willing”.8  This support, although more 
cautious today, is still evident by Poland’s backing of the U.S. and NATO in 
Afghanistan, and agreement to allow the positioning of the U.S. Missile Defense System 
(MDS) on the territory of Poland.9  
2. POLAND AND NATO 
“The North Atlantic Treaty was designed to counter Soviet expansion and 
military power.  But the Treaty itself was based on common values, identified no enemy, 
protected the sovereign decision-making rights of all members, and was written in 
sufficiently flexible language to facilitate adjustments to accommodate changing 
international circumstances.”10  These values and the protection of sovereign identity of 
the member countries were the most attractive parts of the alliance to Poland.  Therefore, 
the NATO’s Article 2, which states that: “The Parties will contribute toward the further 
development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free 
institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these 
institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They 
will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage 
economic collaboration between any or all of them.”11  This became the main driving 
force for Poland to join the organization.  The decades of forced compliance and 
oppression, instituted by the Soviet Union made the Polish desire for independence and 
the ability to decide their own national destiny a driving force in the political world.  At 
the same time the Polish political class wanted to be a part of modern system of 
governments and economies which would allow them to realize their potential in Europe 
and beyond.  
 Almost at the same level of importance was Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, 
which states that: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in 
                                                 
8 Stanley R. Sloan, Permanent Alliance?  NATO and the Transatlantic Bargain from Truman to 
Obama (The continuum International Publishing Group Inc. 2010), 263. 
9 Sloan, Permanent Alliance, 122/141. 
10 Ibid., 6. 
11 Ibid., 292. 
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Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently 
they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of 
individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United 
Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and 
in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of 
armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. 
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall 
immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated 
when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain 
international peace and security.”12  The fact that the last Russian soldier left Poland 
“…on 17 September 1994 [which] coincided with the anniversary of the Soviet invasion 
of Poland in 1939...”13 was an additional motivation for the Republic of Poland to join 
NATO and dramatically raise the cost of the future aggression, by any foe, against 
Poland.     
Despite nearly five decades and two generations of Poles raised under Soviet 
control, the perception of the United States and NATO was overwhelmingly positive 
among Polish population.  The Poles were often considered the most resilient among all 
the nations of the Soviet controlled Eastern Block.  They lived up to this reputation and 
eventually exceeded it by creating the Solidarity movement against the totalitarian 
political and economic system forced by the Soviet Union which culminated in the 
similar instance throughout the region and the eventual collapse of the whole communist 
system and the emergence of new democratic countries in Eastern Europe. 
Once free and democratized since 1989, and a member of NATO and European 
Union, Poland remained a strong ally of the United States.  Although more mature and 
experienced on the international arena, in the year 2012, after having acquired ample 
experience of collective defense and international relations in fact in the two decades of 
its national freedom,  Poland does not instinctively follow the lead of the United States as 
                                                 
12 Sloan, Permanent Alliance, 293. 
13 Simon, Poland and NATO, 24. 
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it did during its democratic “infancy”.  However, possessing similar values, principals, 
and ideals the decisions and interests of the two countries are similar on many levels. The 
effects of the Iraq war as well as the Afghan campaign, as well as the   efforts by the 
President Barack Obama to “reset” the relationship with Russia put some additional strain 
on Poland-U.S. relations but the long relationship is very resilient and it will take much 
more to weaken the bond between those two long-time allies.  
From the initial moment of freedom and independence, Poland understood the 
importance of joining NATO even in the middle of transition, which was happening due 
to dissolution of Soviet Union and drastic changes in the strategic balance in Europe and 
the World.  This was emphasized by the former deputy chief of the Polish mission to 
NATO, Witold Waszczykowski, at the round-table discussion at the Euro-Atlantic 
Association, in Warsaw on April 9, 1999 when he said: “Speaking honestly, we have 
rather mixed feeling [concerning the 1999 Strategic Concept], because we really would 
like to enjoy membership in “traditional” NATO.  For half a century, we in Poland were 
denied stability and security that was enjoyed, for example, in the U.S. At least for a few 
years we would like to enjoy peace and security and simply feel confident under the 
nuclear umbrella…”14  The process which enabled Poles to achieve that goal was laid 
before them earlier via the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative and strict guidance and 
requirements which were presented and monitored by the member countries.15  Poles did 
not waste any time and within short period became involved in numerous NATO actions 
and initiatives.  Their presence, alongside NATO forces, in Balkans and Iraq signaled 
their commitment to the alliance.  Once Poland became a full NATO member, on 12 
March 199916 its contribution to the alliance did not diminish, and in fact increased in 
value and importance.  The greatest example of this can be seen in Afghanistan, where 
the Polish contingent is in charge of Ghazni province since 30 October 200817, with a 
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16 Simon, Poland and NATO, 97. 
17 Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, “Przejęcie odpowiedzialności za prowincję Ghazni,” October 30, 
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standing strength of more than 3000 troops at its peak.  In addition, the aggressive 
modernization of Polish military which included transfer of two FFG-7 Oliver Hazard 
Perry-class frigates from the U.S. Navy and five “Kobben” class-207 submarines from 
the Norwegian Navy, acquisition of 128 Leopard 2A tanks from the Germany army, 
transfer of twenty-three NATO interoperable MiG-29s from the German Air Force, 
transfer of five overhauled C-130s from U.S. Air Force, modernization of Polish MiG- 
29s, and culminated in the procurement of forty-eight new Block-52 F-16s from the 
Lockheed-Martin corporation.18  All the actions taken by the Polish government and 
military signal a very serious approach and commitment to the alliance.  Poland is at the 
very front of NATO not only in principle but also in its actions.  
                                                 
18 Simon, Poland and NATO, 132–135. 
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III. FOREIGN MILITARY BASES IN POLISH HISTORY 
A. HISTORY OF OCCUPATION OF POLAND 
1. EARLY PERIOD 
The geopolitical reality of central Europe forms the key to Poland’s stormy 
history and frequent conflict with other Slavs, Swedes and Germans.  As the organization 
of the state system and the balance of power was shifting at the end of the18th century, 
the Prussian, Austrian and Russian dynasties made common cause against Poland and   
the Kingdom of Poland ceased to exist as a state.19  Poland was erased from the map of 
Europe until the end of World War I.  This period of occupation was also the longest 
period of foreign troops on Polish soil.  The Austrian, Prussian, and Russian military 
forces were re-sent throughout Polish cities and country side.  Generations of Poles were 
born under this system of oppression, and the foreign military presence was one of the 
major remainders of this reality.  Poles in exile also fought in the Napoleonic wars on the 
side of French.  Napoleon was sympathetic to the “Polish cause” and after defeating 
Prussian forces in 1806, after negotiations with Czar Alexander I, Bonaparte established 
the Warsaw Principality on14 June 1807.20  After Napoleon’s defeat in 1814, the Vienna 
Congress redrew the map of Europe and restructured political situation.  The Warsaw 
Principality was transformed into Polish Kingdom in 1815, which was a fraction of 
former Polish state.21  Many uprisings and smaller skirmishes occurred in the following 
decades on the occupied territories of former Poland.  With each unsuccessful attempt at 
reestablishment of former borders of Poland the occupiers diminished the freedoms in the 
Polish Kingdom.  In the course of the 18th and 19th centuries the territories of Polish 
Kingdom were reabsorbed as provinces by former occupiers, Prussia, Austro-Hungary, 
and Russia and the population subjected to nationalization measures of the dominant 
dynasty, in which the German and the Russian cases were more draconian. 
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After the reestablishment of Polish sovereignty on November 11, 1918, Poland 
enjoyed its independence for period of 21 years.22  The new Poland was integrated within 
the French security system of the interwar period, which the nation left in 1934 with the 
pact with Germany.  This diplomacy failed Poland especially after 1938, at which time 
the Germans actively began to revise the Versailles system with bloodless conquests.  
This diplomatic revolution reached its climax with the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact at the 
end of August 1939, the prelude to war and the new partition of Poland. On September 1, 
1939, the German military forces invaded Polish territory and proceeded to move east 
leaving destruction and atrocities in their wake.23  On September 17, 1939, the Soviet 
Union fulfilled its promises to Germany described in Pact   and began its invasion of 
Poland from the east.24  The Polish military fought valiantly but against superior forces 
and faced with two fronts it was destroyed in a matter of weeks.  This event marked the 
beginning of the second dissolution of the Polish State in modern history and a period of 
occupation by foreign Powers.  The fighting during 1939 was the most brutal and vicious 
episode in the recorded history of Poland.  The occupation that followed was supervised 
by military and internal security units from both Germany and the Soviet Union.  These 
forces were above the law and could conduct unrestricted warfare against Polish citizens.  
On the German side the greatest atrocities were committed against Poles, Jews, Romas, 
Gypsies, and other “undesirable” ethnicities and individuals in concentration camps.  
Additionally, other methods of eliminating the Polish population and forced hard labor 
resulted in deaths of more than six million Poles, a 17.2% of the total Polish population 
by the Nazis.25  Soviets did not have concentration camps, per se, but Stalin’s anti Polish 
policies of the Terror were extended in practice, as millions of Poles were sent to Siberia 
and other locations were they perished in forced labor camps.  Additionally, thousands of 
intelligentsia, prisoners of war, clergy, and other undesirables were murdered by Soviet 
secret police and military in Katyǹ and many other places.  In total Soviets eliminated 
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23 Ibid., 271. 
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more than million and a half of Poles, a 4.3% of total Polish population, between 1939 
and 1945.26  
2. POST WORLD WAR II PERIOD 
The events of the two time periods described above would have fostered a culture 
that is totally and categorically opposed to foreign military presence on the sovereign 
territory of the Republic of Poland.  However, the events that followed the end of World 
War II did not give Poles the luxury of rejecting, opposing, or even denouncing the 
presence of tens of thousands of Soviet soldiers on its territory.  Unlike the previous two 
episodes of the occupation and presence of foreign military in Poland, in 1944-45, the 
occupiers were supposed to be friends.  After the defeat of the Nazi Germany the Soviet 
Union proclaimed itself a friend and ally of Poland among other countries in Eastern 
Europe.  With the promises of free elections, economic assistance, and common defense, 
the Soviets tried to sway Polish population to support the leadership of the Communist 
Party in Poland.  Despite the message of friendship, the Soviets conducted secret purge in 
Poland (and in other Eastern Bloc countries) eliminating opposition and free-thinking 
elements from Polish populace.27  
Between 1945 and 1956 the Soviet military stationed on the territory of Poland 
did not have any form of legal permission from the government of Poland and was a de-
facto occupation force.28  Poland and other Eastern European countries were not only 
forced to accept the presence of Soviet military forces on their territory but they had to 
provide for their needs (in addition to other resources which the Soviet ally demanded).  
In 1957, following the death of Josef Stalin, negotiation about the status of Soviet 
military forces in Poland was initiated.  The initial posture of the Russian delegation was 
very negative, with an attitude of a big brother who knows what is good for the younger 
sibling.  Most of the Polish initiatives were dismissed and eventually the talks were 
abruptly stopped at the end of September.  However, just as abruptly, the negotiations 
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27 Mariusz Krogulski, Okupacja w imię sojuszu. Armia Radziecka w Polsce 1956–1993, 7. 
28 Ibid., 11. 
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resumed on  October 14 and on October 23  both sides signed an agreement which 
delineated among other things the number of Soviet personnel to be stationed in Poland 
(maximum of 66,000), locations (39 sites) for the aforementioned personnel, and 
movement (a system of roads between bases, airports, and training areas) of the Soviet 
forces.  In addition, it classified the Soviet military presence in Poland as temporary.  The 
agreement was classified and only the top echelon of Polish government was permitted to 
access it.29  Separate negotiations were taking place at the same time pertaining to a 
“status of forces agreement,” which detailed procedures and jurisdiction over the crimes 
committed by Soviet soldiers stationed in Poland.30  Additional delegations were 
working on agreements pertaining to use by Soviets of Polish national forests, polish rail, 
and other lesser issues.  Finally, the lease of the land and infrastructure and services 
rendered were discussed.  The Soviet side insisted that Soviet Union should be 
responsible for 50% of the combined costs which were based on the costs of Polish 
military forces and like those forces the use of training areas, airports, and bombing/firing 
ranges was free of charge.31  During the mid and late seventies the Polish government 
tried to renegotiate the agreements with less than successful results.  The Soviets used the 
argument that “…thousands [of Russian soldiers] are buried in Poland [which they 
liberated], and you [Poles] are sending us bills!”32  Until 1993, when the last Soviet 
soldier left the territory of Poland, more than 100 documents and agreements about the 
“temporary” presence of Soviet military forces in Poland were signed and all of them 
heavily favored the “occupier.” Even with the agreements greatly favoring the Soviet 
forces, they did not comply or fulfill the legal promises they made.33 At the peak of the 
Soviet presence in Poland (since 1957) its military was using, over 70,000 hectares, 1,157 
housing units (totaling about 9,100 apartments), 332 military buildings, 805 warehouses, 
240 houses, and 1,340 other type buildings.  Also, 201 aircraft, 85 helicopters, 598 tanks, 
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1,108 armored personnel carriers, 345 heavy artillery (over 100mm) and many other 
types of Soviet equipment including nuclear weapons.34  
3. POST COMMUNIST PERIOD 
The departure of Soviet military forces from Poland in the 1990s combined with 
the change of political system pave the way for declassification of the 48 years of 
documents pertaining to Soviet military presence in Poland.  Among them the list of 615 
Poles killed by Soviet soldiers35 and thousands of documents detailed other crimes 
committed by Russian servicemen against people and property in Poland was released.  
Toward the end of Soviet presence in Poland, from the 1970s until the end of the 1980s 
the organized crime type of activities were common among the soldiers including high 
ranking individuals.  The black market around Soviet installations was booming and 
consisted of common items as well as weapons, munitions, and other military equipment.   
In addition, the condition of grounds, infrastructure, and buildings left behind by 
Soviet forces was reminiscent of a war zone.  The departing occupants made sure that the 
buildings that they left behind would not be usable.  In many cases the roofs have been 
torn off the building, the doors and door jams were destroyed or removed, windows and 
other glass items were broken, the sinks, toilets, and other bathroom equipment were 
removed or broken, and even electric cables were ripped out of the walls.  Everything of 
value was removed or destroyed.36  As for the payment of leases, utilities, and other bills 
Poland recouped only a fraction of what Soviet Union was supposed to pay.  
Additionally, between 1991 and 1993 Soviet forces stationed in Poland refused to make 
any payments.37  The scale of ecological damage was never declared, especially because 
until 1981, there were no records of this kind.  Finally, during the negotiations with the 
newly formed Russian Federation in 1992 about money Soviet Russia owed to Poland for 
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various outstanding services and damages caused by Soviet military forces in Poland, the 
Russians once more reminded Poles that they sacrificed so much to liberate Poland from 
the clutches of Nazi Germany, and this time they put a price tag on the liberation!  In a 
gesture not atypical of the reigning mentality and sense of wrong that dominates bilateral 
relations, the Russian Federation’s General Staff calculated that during the liberation of 
Poland from July 1944 to March 1945, more than 3,246,000 Soviet soldiers took part in 
combat operations.  During that time the Red Army incurred the following losses:  
1. 477,295 dead and 1,636 wounded 
2. 2,692 aircraft lost (963,620,000 rubles) 
3. 2,966 tanks and self-propelled artillery (688,557,000 rubles) 
4. 3,960 pieces of artillery (714,896,000 rubles) 
5. 7,605 wheeled vehicles (100,385,000 rubles) 
In addition Soviet army incurred following expenditures: 
1. 69,161 rail cars of ammunition (10,319,000 rubles) 
2. 24,792 aircraft munitions (137,196,000 rubles) 
3. 992,906 tons of petroleum products (697,666,000 rubbles) 
4. Medical equipment and supplies (150,000,000 rubles) 
Baltic Navy lost: 
1. 560 sailors 
2. 129 aircraft (167,700,000 rubles) 
3. 10 torpedo boats (13,000,000 rubles) 
4. 1 submarine (18,000,000 rubles) 
The Soviet Union’s expenditures used in liberation of Poland to 26,720,959,000 
rubles.  Surely, such an assessment is one way to shift the burden and to assess the costs 
of alliance.  Additionally, the reconstruction of railways during the WW II and 
sustainment of Red Army during that period was estimated to be 12,211,335,000 
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rubles.38  Final negotiations pertaining to relocation of Russian troops from the territory 
of Poland took place on April 13-15, 1992.  The Russian side estimated the value of 
Soviet build structures to be 400,000,000 dollars and subtracted 100,000,000 dollars for 
repairs of those structures, demanding payment of remaining 300,000,000 dollars.  This 
sum became the major point of contention between the two sides.  In the end, after 15 
unsuccessful attempts at resolution, Polish president Lech Walesa persuaded Russian 
president Boris Yeltsin to accept the “zero option.”  On May 22, 1992, both sides signed 
the agreement in Moscow resolving the problems of movement of Russian forces from 
the territory of Poland and financial matters pertaining to ex-Soviet structures and 
transportation of Russian military forces.39  On September 17, 1993,“ fifty-four years 
after the Red Army swept across Poland's eastern border, the final 24 Russian soldiers 
retreated unceremoniously into Belarus, leaving Poland free of foreign interveners for the 
first time since Nazi Germany invaded to ignite World War II.”40  
4. THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN MILITARY PRESENCE IN POLAND 
The above events created certain reservation in Polish government and society 
about foreign military presence.  Many Polish citizens see any permanent military 
presence in Poland as a remainder of the past.  However, they are in the minority when it 
comes to NATO and/or United States military forces.  The threat from the East is still the 
number one concern among Poles, and many see the possible future presence of allied 
military forces on the territory of the Republic of Poland as a guarantee of the common 
defense described in the Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.  “At the 
same time, the American soldier has formed a theme in much of European politics and 
society since the beginning of the 20th century, if not earlier.  A united Europe that has 
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gone from self-destruction in the age of total war to prosperity and peace is unthinkable 
without American defense policy as well as soldiers and arms.”41  
                                                 
41 Donald Abenheim, “The U.S. and Europe Military Power: Ideas, Institutions, Society, Policy, and 
Strategy from the 18th century until the 21st century” Naval Postgraduate School. 
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IV. U.S. BASES IN EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE, HISTORY, 
BASIC ISSUES AND POLICY, AND FUTURE 
A. HISTORY OF UNITED STATES OVERSEAS MILITARY BASES 
1. THE BEGINNING OF OVERSEAS PRESENCE 
Since the advent of the United States as a global power in the mid-20th century, 
defense forces beyond the continental United States and the hemisphere became a central 
feature of policy. “For nearly half a century, the security and foreign policy of the United 
States has rested on an overseas basing system that was extensive, robust, and cheap.  
This system was not the only reason the United States has been the world’s dominant 
military and political power since the end of World War II, but it certainly has been one 
of the major symbols of that status, garnering respect, envy, and resentment abroad and 
sometimes complacency from those in the United States charged with maintaining 
superpower status.”42  This view of the U.S. military posts around the world was a major 
change from the previous position of the United States toward world politics and 
international involvement in the 18th and 19th centuries.  Based on unhappy experiences 
with the French and European war of the era, President George Washington in his 
farewell address on 1796 called for America “…to steer clear of permanent alliances with 
any portion of the foreign world.”43  Many politicians and Americans shared that view 
which changed gradually from the end of the 19th century through the era of the world 
wars. The first overseas bases, per se, were in the Philippines. But, even after intervention 
in Europe in 1917 , “the war to end all wars” ended, the United States quickly withdrew 
its garrison from the Rhineland and therefore limited its involvement in the World, 
especially European affairs, to monetary power and no troops of any kind, whereas these 
were on station in Asia in token size.  Unfortunately, this withdrawal from Europe in the 
1920s proved to be a disastrous decision which, in part, led to another conflict on the 
“old” continent and eventually intensified and started World War II. 
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The geography of the United States allowed it to remain somewhat isolated from 
the global conflict of World War II, until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 
December 7, 1941.  U.S. bases existed in the Philippines, on Hawaii, and the Panama 
Canal, and, in 1941, were extended to Iceland. These, however, were only a shadow of 
the post war system.  But even prior to this event, President Roosevelt, the government, 
and the military of the United States were faced with a high probability, if not certainty, 
that the U.S. will have to get involved in the war at some point in time.  This prompted 
the buildup of industry, military, and the establishment of a network of overseas military 
bases on a small scale in preparation for future conflict and as a preemptive denial of 
strategically important location to the enemy.  “This initial expansion into Latin America 
was driven by a concept of hemispheric defense that sought to establish barriers against 
air assault by German long range dirigibles and to exclude German submarine 
operations.”44  Such a policy was a continuation of goals put in hand with the decision 
for the first steps of mobilization ca. 1938.  Additionally, the United States began 
establishment of bases to facilitate the “bridge across the Atlantic” including northern and 
southern routes and expansion of the military footprint throughout Pacific.  However, the 
Pacific theater was considered secondary to the European, as evident in the statement of 
the Secretary of the Navy in November 1941 against fortification of the island of Guam 
in order to avoid provoking the Japanese.45   
2. POST WORLD WAR II ERA OF U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE 
ABROAD 
The overseas networks of bases created  during the World War II were  on a vast 
scale and augmented by planning for postwar bases in wartime contributed greatly to the 
defeat of the Axis Powers and were an integral part of the future plan in which the U.S. 
emerged as the leader of the free world and a global “policeman,” guarding peace and 
democracy, which was clearly stated by the President Harry S. Truman in the following 
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statement: “Though the United States wants no profit or selfish advantage out of this war, 
we are going to maintain the military bases necessary for the complete protection of our 
interests and of world peace.  Bases which our military experts deem to be essential for 
our protection we will acquire.  We will acquire them by arrangements consistent with 
the United Nations Charter.”46  Additionally, the economic position of the United States, 
“…accounting for some 50 per cent of world economic output…”47 enabled it to fulfill 
its plans and maintain the aforementioned network of “essential” bases.  Nonetheless, 
FDR planned for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe within two years of war’s 
end, a contingency which went aglimmering with the rise of the Cold War.  Initially, this 
resulted in reduction of American overseas military facilities as U.S. forces were 
demobilized from their wartime strength.  However, with the advent of the Korean War 
and subsequent “Cold War,” the policy of contraction of the overseas bases was revised 
and somewhat reversed.  “The U.S. committed itself to the construction of democracy, 
prosperity, and security for western and central Europe and the containment of the Soviet 
Union in the atomic age.  This diplomatic revolution meant that the U.S. soldier had to 
remain in Europe in a phase of neither war nor peace that portended challenges of policy 
and strategy that derived in part from the former epoch, but on a new scale and fateful 
potential that was quite without precedent.”48 In Pax Americana, Ronald Steel described 
the U.S. security structure as “…an Empire that rests upon the pledge to use American 
military power to combat communism, not only as a form of imperialism, but even as a 
social doctrine in the under-developed states.” continuing “Although the desire to defend 
other nations against communism is not an imperial ambition, it has led our country to 
use imperial methods; establishment of military garrisons around the globe, granting of 
subsidies to client governments and politicians, application of economic sanctions and 
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even military force against recalcitrant states, and employment of a veritable army of 
colonial administrators…”49  
3. THE CONTEMPORARY DILEMMA OF U.S. OVERSEAS 
PRESENCE  
In 2012, the United States has about 860 military facilities in 46 foreign locations 
throughout the world.50  The U.S. military uses those bases for various reasons, ranging 
from data-gathering to launching drone attacks against terrorists.  However, most of these 
installations are support-type facilities.  Additionally, a large percentage of bases are 
shared with the host nation’s military.  The placement of U.S. military personnel abroad 
has always been very controversial both in the domestic and international realms.  James 
Carafano, in his article in the San Francisco Examiner titled “Without ample overseas 
bases, US will lose significant power”51 argues that, as a global power, the United States 
needs overseas bases in order to quickly project its power and defend its interests around 
the world.  He counters recent popular claims that the global mission of the United States 
military can be accomplished from within the U.S. by the use of new weapon systems by 
arguing that to maintain similar deployable forces and overall capability the U.S. military 
would have to drastically increase the number of its warships and aircraft which, in turn, 
would require additional bases in the U.S. and a huge increase in military spending.  His 
arguments show a definite need for the basing of American servicemen and women, as 
well as equipment, abroad in order to maintain global reach and the ability to participate 
in long-term military actions away from U.S. mainland.  Additionally, he cites the 
expansion of locations of bases since the end of Cold War and shows the necessity of 
additional adjustments in basing policy.  Proposed bases in the Republic of Poland are a 
prime example of such an adjustment. 
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4. THE IMPACT OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS 
The post 2007 economic crisis in the United States is forcing the Obama 
Administration to reduce spending across the board.  As always, many military programs, 
including maintaining of overseas bases, are at forefront of the items proposed to be 
reduced.  Of those proposed cuts in the overseas presence of U.S. military, the American 
forces in Europe would be the most affected.  Presently, the United States has 
approximately 80,000 troops in Europe, “…spread across 28 main operating bases 
primarily in Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Spain.”52 Many believe that those 
bases are leftovers from the Cold War era and that they outlived their usefulness.  
However, “the U.S. military presence in Europe helps to achieve American policy aims in 
the broader Eurasia and Middle East regions.  From Arctic to Levant, from the Maghreb 
to the Caucasus, Europe is at one of the most important crossroads of the world.  U.S. 
military bases in Europe provide American leaders with flexibility, resilience, and 
options in a dangerous world.  Today, the garrisons of American service personnel in 
Europe are no longer the fortressed of the Cold War but the forward operation bases of 
the 21st century.”53  The latest round of proposed defense cuts announced on January 26, 
2012, included the following European Commands resources: 
• The Air Force A-10 squadron from Spangdahlem Air Base in Germany 
• 603rd Air Control Squadron from Aviano Air Base in Italy 
• V Corps Army headquarters from Wiesbaden, Germany 
• 170th Brigade Combat Team from Baumholder, Germany 
• 172nd Brigade Combat Team from Grafenwöhr, Germany 
• Reduction of 2,500 Army personnel from support units in Germany 
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All together, more than 11,000 troops out of the 80,000 currently stationed in 
Europe 80,000.54 Those reductions will be offset by the rotational deployment of troops 
from continental United States into the European theater.  This plan will save money in 
the short run; however, the cost of new infrastructure needed for the abovementioned 
units in the U.S. combined with the logistics costs of the rotations may quickly erase any 
savings achieved by decreasing of the American military footprint in Europe.  
Additionally, the reductions can upset the balance of power in Europe and around the 
World as “the U.S. military presence in Europe deters American adversaries, strengthens 
allies, and protects U.S. interests.  Whether it is preparing and deploying U.S. and allied 
troops for Afghanistan or responding to a humanitarian crisis in the region, the U.S. is 
able to project power and react to the unexpected because of its forward-bases military 
capabilities in Europe.  Reducing this capability will only make America weaker on the 
world stage.”55  
5. THE MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM 
The last aspect of the U.S. military presence in Europe is the Ballistic Missile 
Defense (BMD).  The agreements signed by the Bush Administration with Republic of 
Poland and Czech Republic and later modified by Obama Administration will create new 
U.S. installations in Eastern Europe.  In addition to these sites, the U.S. Air Force will 
established small permanent presence in Poland combined with a larger rotations 
comprised of F-16 and C-130 aircraft.56  This new concept of rotational presence 
combined with small permanent footprint, collocated with host nation’s military assets 
may be the future of new U.S. overseas presence.    
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V. POLISH DEFENSE POLICIES AND BASES 
A. THE MODERN HISTORY OF POLISH NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 
The national security of the Republic of Poland in the year 2012 emerges in   
three major statements of policy and many supporting documents.  The three main 
documents examined in this paper will be in order: The Constitution of Poland,57National 
Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland (approved by the president and cabinet 
members in 2007),58 and the National Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland 
(2009).59  In addition, the latest Polish Strategic Defense Review (2011)60 and Strategic 
Report of the armed forces of the Republic of Poland (2012) will be analyzed in the lines 
that follow. These documents in their present form represent the transformation of Poland 
from its role in the Warsaw Pact in the years until 1989 and its, at times, twisted path to 
Euro-Atlantic integration in the decades since.    
After the end of World War II, Poland was included by force by the Soviet Union 
into the Eastern Bloc and became one of the Central European countries under the rule of 
a Communist government, and perhaps the most restive of such nations.  This fact was 
then and is still seen today, as a formal occupation of territory of Poland by the Soviet 
Union, despite the existence of the internationally recognized People’s Republic of 
Poland during that time.  After the revolutionary events of 1991 and subsequent fall of 
the Soviet Empire, Poland declared its re-birth as a democratic country and amended the 
existing constitution of the People’s Republic of Poland to reflect new character of the 
nation and established legal basis for the democratic Polish State.  The new Polish 
Constitution was adopted on 2 April 1997, approved by a national referendum on 25 May 
1997, and was fully implemented on 17 October 1997.   
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1. THE CONSTITUTION OF POLAND 
The following articles of the Constitution of Poland outline the role of Polish 
military, define the national chain of command, and mandate civil control over the armed 
forces.  Granted the role of the armed forces in the state in the interwar period, as well as 
in the final phase of life in the socialist bloc, the formulation of such clauses on more or 
less the western pattern symbolized a major undertaking of statecraft fraught with its own 
challenges.  
Article 26 
1. The Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland shall safeguard the independence 
 and territorial integrity of the State, and shall ensure the security and inviolability 
 of its borders. 
2. The Armed Forces shall observe neutrality regarding political matters and shall be 
 subject to civil and democratic control. 
Article 134 
1. The President of the Republic shall be the Supreme Commander of the Armed 
 Forces of the Republic of Poland. 
2. The President of the Republic, in times of peace, shall exercise command over the 
 Armed Forces through the Minister of National Defence. 
3. The President of the Republic shall appoint, for a specified period of time, the 
 Chief of the General Staff and commanders of branches of the Armed Forces. The 
 duration of their term of office, the procedure for and terms of their dismissal 
 before the end thereof, shall be specified by statute. 
4. The President of the Republic, for a period of war, shall appoint the Commander-
 in-Chief of the Armed Forces on request of the Prime Minister. He may dismiss 
 the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in accordance with the same 
 procedure. The authority of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, as 
 well as the principle of his subordination to the constitutional organs of the 
 Republic of Poland, shall be specified by statute. 
5. The President of the Republic, on request of the Minister of National Defence, 
 shall confer military ranks as specified by statute. 
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6. The authority of the President of the Republic, regarding his supreme command 
 of the Armed Forces, shall be specified in detail by statute. 
Article 135 
The advisory organ to the President of the Republic regarding internal and 
 external security of the State shall be the National Security Council. 
Article 136 
In the event of a direct external threat to the State, the President of the Republic 
 shall, on request of the Prime Minister, order a general or partial mobilization and 
 deployment of the Armed Forces in defence of the Republic of Poland.61                                                                     
Despite the broad character of the above articles, the content represents a radical 
departure from the Communist civil military customs of party dictatorship which were 
the guiding principal for the post-World War II Poland and its military.  The enforcement 
of the communist ideology was not only limited to civilian population and government, 
but the indoctrination was even more present in the Polish military as an army of the 
socialist type pioneered by Trotsky in the 1920s and adapted to the Polish nation in the 
years after 1945.  Almost all of the officers and 100% of the high ranking officers were 
members of the Communist party; additionally a large portion of national budget and 
production was subjected to or supported by the military. After the change of the political 
system in Poland, the military was subjugated to civilian democratic government and the 
political influence of military was diminished, but not without contradictions and 
setbacks.  Additionally, military related expenditures were decreased dramatically and set 
not to go below 1.95% of national gross product of previous year.62  In reality the level of 
1.95% became somewhat of a target for the military budget in Poland.  The legacy 
ideology of one-way communications from the Ministry of Defense is the only remaining 
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aspect of that system and it is slowly being altered and replaced by the new, western 
style, system.  
2. THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF POLAND 
The national security strategy of the Republic of Poland is a product of turbulent 
history and its unique geo-political situation.  Over centuries Poland and its citizens 
suffered many defeats and experienced horrible atrocities from the hand of its eastern and 
western neighbors.  In addition, the European allies of Poland rarely fulfilled their 
promises of assistance in time of war.  Those two realities combined with the geography 
of Poland, which is not favorable for territorial defense, created a need for a strong and 
constant security posture for the Polish nation.  As a modern democratic State in heart of 
Europe, Poland is aware of the need for global cooperation and partnership in common 
defense.  Because of this need, Poland was one of the first countries from the former 
Eastern Bloc to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and subsequently European 
Union.  Within this statecraft, Polish policy additionally includes   a strong bilateral 
relationship with the United States.  Granted the legacy of the Ribbentrop-Stalin pact as 
well as the hesitation of France and Britain to rally to the Polish cause in the fall of 1939, 
Poland relies heavily on the transatlantic relations for security and stability, though this 
statecraft has undergone its own sobering up in the past decade.   This is evident by the 
level of importance which Poland ascribes to the global significance of the United States 
as can be seen in the paragraph 19 which is a part of section 2 (Condition of national 
security of the Republic of Poland) of the National Security Strategy of the Republic of 
Poland from 2007 and states that “Globally, the United States which guarantees 
international security plays a key role.” And in paragraph 48 of section 3.1 (External 
Security) in which continues with the statement “Bilateral relations with the United States 
occupy a special place in Polish security policy.  Poland acknowledges their strategic 
nature and shall seek to develop them further in the spirit of solidarity and sustainable 
partnership.  Poland shall act to preserve American presence in the European continent, 
also in non-military dimension.” Subsequently, in paragraph 41 it states that “The North 
Atlantic Alliance is for Poland the most important form of multilateral cooperation in a 
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political and military dimension of security and a pillar of stability on the European 
continent, as well as the main ground of transatlantic relations.”  This view is reinforced 
in paragraph 42 with statement that “Poland shall seek to increase NATO’s role as a 
forum of strategic transatlantic dialogue.  [And that] This will reinforce Allied bonds and 
add to NATO’s greater cohesion.”  Paragraph 44 emphasizes the “…membership in the 
European Union [which] determines, to a significant extent, the foundations of Poland’s 
security.  [Also] It radically increased the possibilities of implementation of the Polish 
security policy and [Poland’s] ability to act internationally.  It has strengthened Poland’s 
position in the world and at the same time increased its responsibility for international 
order.  It is evident that as a border country of the European Union, Poland understands 
the significance of robust system of military, economic, and political alliances and 
treaties as a deterrent and multilateral assistance in case of conflict.     
The sections pertaining to military security (3.2) and national defense (subsection 
of 4.3 Executive Subsystems) emphasize the reliance on as well as the readiness to 
participate in Article 5 actions of the North Atlantic Treaty and collective defense and 
support of UN, NATO, and EU policies including crisis response, stability operations, 
peacekeeping operations, and stability operations.  In addition, the national defense 
section defines near-term size, composition, general direction of the modernization, and 
national reserve forces.  It also mandates continuous improvement of long term planning 
in research and development of advanced military, communication, and acquisition of 
new technology and equipment.  Reforms in military education and training of civilian 
personnel are also designated as one of key tasks.63 
3. THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF POLAND 
The National Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland is the most in-depth 
document of all three documents presented in this paper, and in a way, it is an expansion 
of the National Security Strategy with comprehensive definitions, explanations, and plans 
                                                 




for general defense, structure of military forces, industry, and civilian organizations.  It 
acknowledges the evolution of national defense and the inclusion of non-military aspects 
of national security including but not limited to political crisis, energy, terrorism, cyber 
terrorism and crimes, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as 
expansion of the area of operation for Polish military from local to regional and global.  
As in the prior document the national security is being directly linked to NATO, EU, and 
the United States.  In paragraph 11 the low probability of local large scale military 
conflict is highlighted but smaller conflict like the Russian incursion into Georgia, and 
other regional engagements in Balkans, Middle-East, with special attention given to 
highly stressed relationship between West and Muslim world.  Because of this, emphasis 
is put on global presence, deployability, and the creation of a highly mobile military force 
in paragraph 18.  In paragraph 21, the improvement of relations with Poland’s eastern 
neighbors is mentioned as an additional way to improve national security and regional 
stability.  
The document also distinguishes between peacetime and wartime strategies of 
defense.  Section 2.3 is dedicated to peacetime national defense.  Readiness, preparations, 
and training are the main points of this section.  The readiness of the civil and defense 
industries is also addressed as well as expansion of defensive infrastructures, which is 
somewhat contrary to the earlier emphasis on a highly mobile military force.  The 
education of the general population in the field of defense and patriotism is somewhat of 
a throw-back to citizen soldier days and conscription service.  In addition, constant 
emphasis is put on the allies / NATO inclusion in military and civil training, and planning 
for possible crisis.   
Section 2.4 addresses the other than peacetime situations.  First, the crisis 
management takes place under the peacetime chain of command and it is seen as the 
main tool in de-escalation and prevention of war between Poland and possible aggressor, 
or any of the allies and possible aggressors.  On the territory of Poland the National Crisis 
Response Plan allows the regional public administrations to take action to raise the level 
of civil readiness.  This also includes prevention or reaction to a terrorist attack.  If the 
situation escalates the Government of Poland can institute martial law, initiate 
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mobilization of reserves, and switch to wartime chain of command and appointing of 
supreme commander.               
If the situation described in section 2.4 deteriorates and attack is imminent, the 
general mobilization for the purpose of expansion of military will be initiated and 
movement of existing military forces into strategic locations initiated.  At that time 
military forces of allied nations will enter Poland and take up strategic positions 
alongside Polish forces.  In case of war outside Poland but within the jurisdiction of 
Article V, the Polish military may deploy the units which were allotted to the defense of 
the NATO allies in time of crisis. 
Chapter III describes in-depth the Polish defense system, including military 
forces, civil element, chain of command, responsibilities of each elements of the system, 
responsibilities of the President, cabinet members, and MoD during peacetime and 
wartime.  It is followed by descriptions of responsibilities of the Polish military in 
various situations and missions.  In case of conflict between Article V operations and 
defense of Poland, the Polish military will defend Poland.  The overall guidance 
pertaining to modernization and transformation of various aspects of the Polish military 
such as C4ISR, medical units, logistics, air defense, military education, civ-mil relations 
and others is presented in chapter IV.  Next the structure of Polish military forces is 
broken down in section 4.3.  Further analysis of the chain of command during peacetime 
and wartime is conducted in section 4.4.  Chapter V describes overall defense preparation 
of the Polish nation with all the military and non-military parts of the system.  Chapter VI 
addresses the direction of transformation of the national defense system.64 
4. CONTEMPORARY ISSUES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AND 
DEFENSE POLICY IN POLAND 
The above described document addresses all the aspects of the National Defense 
Strategy.  However, not all the parts fit together well.  In fact some of the ideas, projects, 
and/or guidelines contradict each other, other documents, or actions taken by the military 
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leadership or political leadership or defense budget allocations.  Additionally, the future 
plans of a grand scale change much too often with major restructuring happening every 
few years.  This lack of continuity on the part of planners is taking a heavy toll on Polish 
fighting forces which have to move the headquarters back and forth and restructure itself 
for deployment and then again for return to home base.   
5. THE POLISH STRATEGIC DEFENSE REVIEW 
The latest Polish Strategic Defense Review from 2011 is a very robust document 
that addresses most of the future problems of Polish military.  However, this document 
fails to identify the current reasons for the problems existing now and possibly in the 
future.  Another major change in this Strategic Defense Review is the starting point of the 
assessment.  The authors decided to not project the future needs of the military, the next 
25 years, from the date of this report but rather from the point of completion of the last 
cycle which will end in 2018.  By doing this, they feel the continuity of the programs and 
actions will be preserved and overall direction of the Polish military will not be changed 
mid-course.  Of course, the possibility of corrections to ongoing programs is still allowed 
under this new system.65   
The SDR identifies the professionalization of the Polish military forces as the 
greatest change and most significant undertaking for the future of national defense.  It 
also states that the effective fighting force in today’s conflicts must be mobile, 
independent, highly trained, and ready for action on short notice.  This can only be 
achieved by a professional military force.  The professionalization process forced 
changes of all aspects of Polish military.  Training, sustainment, logistics, mobilization, 
reserves, housing, acquisitions of equipment, and many other aspects of military had to 
be attuned to this new and progressive way of staffing the national fighting forces.  This 
is a drastic departure from the old system of conscription and security policy based in 
large on national self-reliance and the cult of the citizen-soldier.  However, given the 
limited national resources and size of Polish population, as well as modern realities of 
military fighting forces, which require highly skilled, professional soldiers, trained in 
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modern tactics, and equipped with the latest weapons, communications, and protective 
equipment, the operational leadership of Polish military realized that the citizen-soldier 
can no longer fulfill the role of main fighting force.  The professionalization of the 
military in Poland is based on the military structure of the United States with strong non-
commissioned officer corps, smaller but more agile, highly skilled and fitted with modern 
weapons and equipment, trained in NATO procedures, tactics, and strategies, and fully 
incorporated into the alliance.  In addition the ratio of combat troops to support troops is 
on the rise increasing the Polish military’s operational strength without increasing the 
cost.66   
The reduction of personnel, due to professionalization, allowed the Polish military 
to decrease the physical size of its infrastructure and transform the remaining fixed forces 
and bases.  In addition, this reduction flattened the administrative chain-of-command by 
eliminating the purely legacy bureaucratic element of military districts.  Unfortunately, 
this reduction stopped short of elimination of the old fix-defense elements and is still 
draining limited resources away from the, much needed, modernization of Polish 
military.  Some of the examples of these legacy systems are: investments in fixed 
communications and purchase of short range small military transport M-28, Bryza, 
aircraft, and many other such endeavors.   
Chapter Two of the Strategic Defense Review titled “Military Forces of Republic 
of Poland 2035: Tasking, Requirements, Operational Capabilities”, projects future needs 
and possible engagements as well as describes the desired end-state of Polish military in 
the year 2035.  The described possible operations are divided into three geopolitical 
areas.  First, and most important, are the operations on the territory of Poland.  The 
defense of Poland is seen as the defense of NATO and assumption is made that NATO 
and European Union allies will play a significant role in this scenario.  The next scenario 
addresses the possibility of unilateral military defense against military aggression.  The 
subcategories of this section address the entire spectrum of operations needed to preserve 
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the integrity of Poland and it is also looking ahead to new aspects of Polish National 
Security such as advanced cyberspace warfare and space operations.  In addition, internal 
security and stability operations to include but not limited to acts of terrorism and 
response to natural and/or manmade disasters is addressed.  Second, are the operations on 
the territory of any NATO member-nation.  Again, all major aspects of operations are 
listed including prospective stability and peace-keeping operations.  Last are the 
operations out of area described in the NATO treaty.  This is mainly a mediation type 
operations mandated by United Nations, European Union, NATO, or as a part of a 
coalition.  Those operations include peace keeping/making/enforcement, conflict 
prevention, humanitarian relief and operations, disaster relief, non-combatant evacuation 
operations, extraction operations, search and rescue, military aid to civilian authorities, 
enforcement of sanctions/embargo, and counter/anti-terrorism operations.   
The following section describes the defense planning process in detail.  It states 
that the national defense planning is closely tied to the national development planning 
system.  The overall defense planning is dictated by desired end-state capabilities of 
Polish military.  The system which is used to achieve this goal is based on United States’ 
system of PPBS which is comprised of: Planning, Programing, and Budgeting. 
Additionally, emphasis is placed on professionalization and human assets.  The need for 
attracting highly skilled and motivated young men and women into the ranks of Polish 
military as well as emphasis on investment in education and future technologies is 
present in this section and throughout the whole document.67  
The structure of future Polish military is described as modular, highly mobile, 
well educated, and fast acting.  The command system of Polish military will be a part of 
an integrated management system of state protection and it will ensure continuous and 
efficient command of the military in various states of readiness of national defense and in 
all possible security environments.  Additionally, the improvement of the image of the 
military forces and reshaping of the relationship and acceptance by civilian population 
will be a parallel task during the next 25 years.  Finally, the continuation of participation 
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in NATO, EU, and multi-national coalition operations is identified as a major element 
needed to improve the level of efficiency and combat readiness as well as maintenance of 
interoperability within NATO structure.68  
In chapter three titled “Military Forces 2011: analysis TOWS/SWOT”, an 
examination of current state of Polish military is conducted based on western system 
TOWS/SWOT where T stand for threats, O stands for opportunities, W stands for 
weaknesses, and S stands for Strengths.  TOWS Analysis is an effective way of 
combining a) internal strengths with external opportunities and threats, and b) internal 
weaknesses with external opportunities and threats to develop a strategy.69  This system 
was used to:  identify the initial state of the Polish armed forces in relation to the 
development requirements in the long-term planning, to indicate in a systematic way 
possible variants of the strategic direction of the military forces, and to obtain the data 
necessary to make a decision regarding the strategic direction of the armed forces. It was 
not an assessment of the current operational state and readiness of Polish military but to 
identify the conditions pertaining to and causing that state.70  The most significant 
statement pertaining to the readiness concluded that, unfortunately, at the present time the 
strategic defense planning in Polish armed forces is based on equipment capabilities 
instead of total force capability which should include: doctrine, organization, training, 
armaments and military equipment, personnel, leadership, infrastructure, and 
interoperability.71  Also, the participation in NATO/EU/Coalition military actions was 
cited as the key element in testing and modernizing the armaments and military 
equipment as well as training compatibility with NATO standards.  The most negative 
aspects of the current state of readiness were identified as: incomplete equipping of the 
units, incompatibility of the command structure with highly dynamic and constantly 
                                                 
68 Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, Polish Strategic Defense Review, 
http://www.mon.gov.pl/pliki/File/Raport_SPO_14042011.pdf , 90–91. 
69 Shahzad Trading and Consulting FZE, “SWOT & TOWS Analysis” October 4, 2012  
http://www.shahzadtc.com/pdf/SWOTTOWS.pdf 
70 Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, Polish Strategic Defense Review, 
http://www.mon.gov.pl/pliki/File/Raport_SPO_14042011.pdf , 98. 
71 Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, Polish Strategic Defense Review, 
http://www.mon.gov.pl/pliki/File/Raport_SPO_14042011.pdf , 99. 
 40 
changing environment of today’s conflict, and low level of armaments and military 
equipment readiness caused by backlog of periodic maintenance and repairs. The most 
significant restriction causing reduction of progress was identified as the continuous 
rotation of concepts of development and desired end-state of Polish armed forces, which 
in turn are changing the requirements of future acquisitions of armaments and military 
equipment, often during mid-cycle.72 The last chapter presented the two variants of 
strategic direction of the transformation.  Variant 1: “Use of all available opportunities 
for development…[by] adapting military forces of the Republic of Poland to the 
challenges of the modern world with a proactive approach to all opportunities”.  Variant 
2: “Counter the emerging threats…[by] improvement of the functioning of the armed 
forces of the Republic of Poland while reactively avoiding the threats.”73  The variant 1 
was selected as it “…allows for a greater realization of the missions of the armed forces 
of the Republic of Poland, [it] is a part of a developmental state action, to a greater 
extent, allows for progress…” advancement and growth.  In addition, the commission 
found that the current Polish military forces culture is one of risk-aversion systematic 
elimination of weaknesses.  It indicates the introverted nature of the organization and it 
can lead to situations where external opportunities may be missed.  It also addresses the 
minimalistic attitude and policy of just-survival which can affect overall success rate of 
the force.  
The Strategic Defense Review of 2011 is a very progressive document with 
honest findings and good methodology for finding deficiencies, discrepancies, and 
identification of trends.  The somewhat algorithmic approach to the strategy of national 
defense is reminiscent of legacy procedures but sufficiently modernized to reflect the 
fundamental changes that took place in the Polish military since 1989.  It is evident that 
the cadre responsible for creation of this document is very familiar with western military 
doctrine, tactics, procedures, and overall direction of military progress.   
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B. CONCLUSION 
Unfortunately, none of the recent documents mentioned above reflect any changes 
pertaining to Ballistic Missile Defense agreement or the agreements for permanent U.S. 
military presence in Poland---issues of the recent past.  This lack of acknowledgement 
and adjustment of defense policy to reflect this new defense posture could have been 
caused by announcement of those agreements during mid-lifecycle of these documents or 
cautious approach to so far unfulfilled promises.   
The only significant document that reflected the possibility of establishment of 
U.S. military base in Poland was the bilateral Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).  The 
negotiations between U.S. and Polish side took significant amount of time but in the end 
the agreement was signed by both countries ministries of foreign affairs and subsequently 
ratified by the Polish Sejm (parliament of Poland) on 2 December 2010.74   
                                                 
74 Sejm, Official record of ratification of SOFA (December 2, 2010).  
http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/SQL.nsf/ustawyall?OpenAgent&6&100 
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VI. CONTEMPORARY ISSUES OF POLISH-U.S. DEFENSE 
AFFAIRS AND BASES. 
A. POLITICS OF MISSILE DEFENSE 
Although in bilateral agreements pertaining to Ballistic Missile Defense there is 
next to no mention of the ongoing U.S. military presence in Poland, this aspect of defense 
cooperation, in official defense, national security, and policy forms a theme of high 
importance to both governments.  This question of bases and bi lateral defense assumed 
greater importance yet still with the role of missile defense as a theme of strategy and 
military posture in the new century.  Missile defense had been an issue of Atlantic 
defense in the 1980s, and emerged in the new century once more as a topic of debate and 
controversy, bound to be doubly so with the German and Russian neighbors, whose 
skeptical views of such weapons were well known in Warsaw and Washington DC.  This 
fact notwithstanding, the U.S. pursued a new policy of missile defense, including Europe 
and making likely a typical NATO missile crisis as in former times.  In this connection, 
Polish bases played a significant role within the strategic compact and extended 
deterrence and security guarantees between the U.S. and Poland.  
1. THE BUSH-ERA PLANS 
 The Bush administration (2001-2009) continued the policy of the Reagan 
administration placing a high strategic value on missile defense.  In the new century these 
systems were directed against an Iranian threat, and thus in need of a European theater for 
strategic effectiveness of said program.  “In 2002 the Bush Administration began 
informal talks with the governments of Poland and the Czech Republic over the 
possibility of establishing missile defense facilities on their territory.”75  During the 
initial announcement in 2007, “the Bush Administration proposed deploying a ground-
based mid-course defense (GMD) element of the larger Ballistic Missile Defense System 
(BMDS) in Europe to defend against an Iranian missile threat.  The system would include 
                                                 
75 U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in 
Europe by Steven A. Hildreth and Carl Ek. CRS Report RL34051. Washington, DC: Office of 
Congressional Information and Publishing, January 21, 2009, 6. 
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10 interceptors in Poland, Radar in the Czech Republic, and another radar deployed in a 
country closer to Iran, all to be completed by 2013 at a reported cost of at least $4 
billion.”76   Formal negotiations began in early 2007 but were paused due to elections in 
Poland and a subsequent change of leadership.  The populist-nationalist party of Law and 
Justice (PiS) led by Jarosław Kaczyński, was pro BMDS; however, the incoming two-
party coalition led by Civic Alliance (PO) party under the leadership of Donald Tusk was 
more reserved in the bilateral relationship with the U.S. and would re-evaluate the initial 
talks pertaining to BMDS.  The BMDS talks resumed in early 2008.  The major argument 
presented by Polish side was the need for U.S. assistance in the modernization of 
Poland’s air defenses in order to protect the BMDS site and Poland from a possible 
attack.  The PAC-3 Patriot missile batteries were the desired equipment for this role.  
President Bush responded to this request with a declaration that stated: “Before my watch 
is over we will have assessed [Poland’s] needs and come up with a modernization plan 
that’s concrete and tangible.”77  Despite the strong effort the deal was not reached at that 
time.  However, “in a surprise move on 14 August 2008, Polish and U.S. government 
officials initialed an agreement; the formal accord was signed six days later by Rice and 
Sikorski [Polish Secretary of State].”78  There is no doubt that this rapid pace of events 
was caused by the Russia’s military operation against the Republic of Georgia which was 
seen as a blow to U.S. policy in the former USSR and NATO enlargement, which had 
proceeded more or less without serious hindrance since the middle of the 1990s.        
2. OBAMA-ERA PLANS 
After the 2008 elections in the United States, the new Barack Obama 
administration put on hold the BMDS talks and subsequently canceled the program on 
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September 17, 2009.  The reactions and emotions in Poland created by the decision to 
cancel the BMDS program were only amplified by the date of the announcement, which 
coincided with the 70th anniversary of the Soviet Russia’s invasion of Poland in 1939.  
The tone-deaf treatment of such a significant date by the U.S. administration betrayed, at 
least in the minds of its critics, a disregard for the goals and hopes of central Europeans, 
and bespoke a revival of Yalta statecraft. This announcement combined with the Obama 
Administration’s proclamation of the “reset” of the relations with Russia, created a wave 
of negative feeling toward the United States among Poles fearful of a sellout. Such 
persons either knew nothing or had forgotten the character of other missile crises in 
NATO, i.e. the abandonment by the Kennedy administration in the face of Soviet va 
banque in Cuba of the Jupiters in Turkey in 1962 or the cancellation of Skybolt in the 
same year as a burden on U.S.-U.K. relations.  Rather, perceptions of U.S. policy were 
exacerbated by the ill effects of prolonged Polish service in the Iraq operation and fear of 
a more aggressive, revanchist Russia as visible after the Georgian war in 2008.  “Later 
US pledges to place a Patriot missile battery in Poland, and elements of the SM-3 
interceptors which will replace the Bush system, failed to eradicate the perception in 
Warsaw that Polish interests had been sacrificed for the benefit of Washington-Moscow 
relations.”79     
The new Ballistic Missile Defense System, proposed by President Obama, shifted 
its objective from intercepting Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) aimed at the 
United States to protection of Europe and Middle East with a more engaged statecraft of 
multi-lateral security and collective defense versus the bottom up, service oriented 
approach put in hand under the Bush administration.  President Obama himself 
explained: “To put it simply, our new missile defense architecture in Europe will provide 
stronger, smarter, and swifter defenses of American forces and America's allies.  It is 
more comprehensive than the previous program; it deploys capabilities that are proven 
and cost-effective; and it sustains and builds upon our commitment to protect the U.S. 
                                                 




homeland against long-range ballistic missile threats; and it ensures and enhances the 
protection of all our NATO allies.”80  This will be accomplished by continuing the 
program in Poland and Czech Republic as well as adding additional SM-3 interceptor site 
in Romania and an additional radar site in Turkey.81  However, “By wishing to avoid 
another “mistake,” Mr. Komorowski [Polish President] has questioned the long-term 
viability of the US made SM-3 system, which is intended to secure NATO's eastern flank 
from missile attacks launched from the Middle East.”82  
President Obama’s visit to Poland in 2011 improved the relations between two 
allies, but this statecraft came well short of reaching the level of good feeling and comity 
of the Bush era.  Both, “President Obama and President Komorowski welcomed the 
conclusion of a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding, a key step toward the 
establishment of a U.S. Air Force Aviation Detachment in Poland.  The Aviation 
Detachment will strengthen joint interoperability through regular training exercise 
rotations in Poland, largely with U.S. F-16 or C-130 aircraft, beginning in 2013.  F-16s 
from the California Air National Guard will also participate in the July 2011 SAFE 
SKIES training exercise with Polish F-16s as part of Poland’s security preparations for 
the EURO 2012 soccer tournament.”  Additionally, “President Obama discussed with 
President Komorowski and Prime Minister Tusk the next steps in the European Phased 
Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to missile defense, including recent progress in 
implementing Phases I and II of the new missile defense architecture.  The United States 
welcomes Poland’s May 2011 ratification of our Missile Defense Agreement, and the 
U.S. European Command and Polish military leaders will jointly inaugurate a series of 
consultations to take necessary actions to implement this agreement, leading to the 
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deployment of the EPAA’s land-based interceptor site in Poland in 2018.”83  In an effort 
further to improve the relationship between the United States and Poland the Obama 
Administration maintains annual high-level meetings between Polish Ministry of Defense 
and U.S. Department of Defense as well as Department and Ministry of foreign affairs.  
The continuous presence of Polish military forces in Afghanistan is a testament to 
Poland’s commitment to bilateral relationship with the United States. as well as to 
NATO.84     
3. THE RUSSIAN POSITION 
Another problem generated by the plans to create the missile defense system and 
the presence of the U.S. military in Poland has been the deterioration of relationship 
between Poland and Russia as the Putin regime has grown more assertive and the Euro-
Atlantic vibrancy has waned in the face of the world economic crisis.  “The Russians are 
deeply upset and suspicious of what appears to be a lack of candor, understanding and 
realism with regard to U.S. plans for missile defenses. U.S. political leaders relentlessly 
deny basic technical facts that show that the current U.S. missile defense might well 
affect Russia.”85  Despite the fact that the initial negotiations pertaining to the missile 
defense system were conducted solely between United States and Russia, Poland 
managed to interject itself into the process as a mediator as is typical for matters of arms 
and Euro-Atlantic security.  Throughout all the variants of the proposed missile defense 
system the Polish position to host the interceptors has not changed.  This strong desire to 
host the missile defense system and U.S. military forces angered Russia’s civilian and 
military leadership.  In May 2012, General Nikolai Makarov, Russia’s most senior 
military commander said that “A decision to use destructive force pre-emptively will be 
taken if the [missile defense] situation worsens,” and that Russia would counter NATO 
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deployment by stationing short-range Iskander missiles in the Russian Kaliningrad 
exclave near Poland, creating the worst military tensions since the Cold War.86  Russian 
President, Vladimir Medvedev, also stated that “… [he has] set the task to the armed 
forces to develop measures for disabling missile-defense data and control system,” as 
well as that the new Russian strategic ballistic missiles “will be equipped with advanced 
missile defense penetration systems and new highly effective warheads”87  He also 
reiterated the possibility of deployment of tactical missiles to the Kaliningrad exclave, 
which borders Poland. The perception of the Russian leadership is that the “…missile-
defense system will rob their nuclear deterrent of its credibility and destabilize the 
balance of mutually assured destruction that has persisted since the Cold War.”88  
Eventually the missile defense negotiations stalled and the Russian Defense Minister, 
Anatoly Serdyukov, declared that: “We have not been able to find mutually acceptable 
solutions at this point, and the situation is practically at a dead end.”89    
B. CONCLUSION 
The proposed missile defense system and ongoing presence of the U.S. military 
personnel in Poland can be described as at least problematic.  The changes in leadership 
of both countries caused a plethora of different variants of the plans for the missile 
defense system as well as the size, composition, and mission of the proposed American 
military presence in Poland.  This seemingly secondary issue proved to be a main reason 
for the deterioration of U.S.-Polish relations as well as a cause of contention between 
members of European Union who embrace no single, unitary security policy towards 
Moscow and who, since 2007, have embarked on unilateral policies to their particular 
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benefit.  Russia’s strong opposition to both ideas only increases tension between all 
parties involved in the negotiations as well as the other countries in the region.  The 
diametrically opposed positions of Poland and Russia about this issue mean that any 
decision pertaining to the missile defense system and stationing of the U.S. troops in 
Poland will alienate one of the parties involved, despite the reason for the choice.      
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VII. CONTEMPORARY ISSUES OF POLISH-U.S. RELATIONSHIP  
A. CONTEMPORARY HISTORY OF POLISH-U.S. RELATIONS 
For various reasons analyzed in this work, the diplomatic and strategic 
relationship between United States and Poland has been deteriorating.  As Poland 
matures as a democratic country in the international realm and in NATO the 
“honeymoon” period is over and some of Polish politicians, media, and a portion of 
general population misinterpret this conduct as a decline in relationship between U.S. and 
Poland.  Additionally, since the departure of President George W. Bush and the 
introduction of new policies of President Barack Obama the deterioration of the 
relationship between those two allies accelerated somewhat.  The golden age of Polish-
American relations started in 1989 with the collapse of the Communist regimes in Russia 
and Eastern European countries and the statecraft that followed in the past decade.  
Poland was a major force in the process which led to the revolution of the European order 
supported by the United States along the way.  In part, the policies of President Ronald 
Reagan and later President George H.W. Bush, as well as forces within society and state 
in central Europe accelerated the collapse of the Soviet Regime and supported the move 
toward independence among the Soviet Republics and what soon became in the 1990s the 
ex-Warsaw Pact nations. These policies included political, diplomatic, and economic 
assistance to the young governments eager to shake off the Soviet legacy.  Poland was 
one of the primary recipients of this aid and in a short time became the strongest ally of 
the U.S. in the region along with the Czechs and less so other central European countries.  
During that time the security relationship between the two countries was growing 
steadily.  Clinton Administration at first pushed for the creation of Partnership for Peace 
in 1994 (despite Polish skepticism) and in 1995 embraced the principle of NATO 
enlargement. Poland reciprocated this support by backing the United States in the 
international arena not only politically, but also by taking part in U.S.-led military actions 
around the world especially in the wake of the Sept. 11 terror assault on the U.S. and the 
Iraqi campaign of 2003.   
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Many times this support met with somewhat negative reception among Poland’s 
European neighbors and allies whose interests diverged as was especially the case after 
Sept.  11.  Poland’s participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003) and Operation 
Enduring Freedom (2002) in Afghanistan combined with the agreement to host the 
interceptor elements of the U.S. missile defense system were the main causes of this rift 
especially between Poland and the Russian Federation.  Despite of this, the Polish 
government, general population, and military supported the longtime ally of their 
country, the United States of America.  At the same time, as the years passed the burdens 
of expeditionary operations as well as the mixed fortunes of Western strategy in Iraq and 
Afghanistan became manifest, as did a Russian resurgence after years of quietude in the 
face of NATO enlargement with the offensive against Georgia in 2008.  Added to this 
fact has been the onset of the world economic crisis, an event which contrasts sharply 
with the mood and posture of the mid and late 1990s.   
B. DETERIORATING RELATIONSHIP 
The election of President Barak Obama was not only a turning point in the U.S.-
Poland relationship but also in the U.S.-Europe and especially in the U.S.-Russia 
relationships.  The shifting of the priorities away from Europe, as well as to the so called 
“reset” of the relationship with Russia left  many Poles feeling somewhat abandoned by 
the new U.S. administration.  Additionally, the new policies introduced by President 
Obama pushed Poland further away from the U.S. and replaced the feeling of 
abandonment with a feeling of betrayal.  “The shift in views is already becoming 
apparent. While during the presidency of George W. Bush, Poles were more supportive 
of the U.S. leader than almost any other country in the world, including the United States, 
a new survey shows a distinct cooling. Western Europe, which had shuddered at Bush, is 
strongly pro-Obama, while central Europe is more wary of the new U.S. leader’s 
overtures to Russia. 
[In 2009], the Transatlantic Trends poll conducted by the German Marshall Fund 
and other think tanks found that 44 percent of Poles backed Bush, one of the highest 
levels of support he had in Europe, while the controversial Texan had the favor of only 
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11 percent of the French. This year, only 55 percent of Poles support Obama, the lowest 
level in Europe, while 88 percent of the French like Obama.”90   
1. POLICY 
Some of the policy missteps that contributed to this decline were the cancelation 
of the Bush-era missile defense system in Poland and Czech Republic which “President 
Obama formally announced [on September 17, 2009, the 70th anniversary of the Soviet 
invasion of Poland]…with little notice given to either European capital. Both Warsaw 
and Prague had spent considerable political and diplomatic capital on the [MDS] third-
site deal, and the perception was that the Kremlin had achieved a significant strategic 
victory.”  Additionally, “In November 2009, it was reported that Moscow had simulated a 
war game in which Russian armed forces invaded Poland and nuclear missiles were fired.  
The deafening silence in Washington once again left Warsaw with the impression that the 
resetting of relations with Moscow was a greater priority for the U.S. than its traditional 
alliances, particularly NATO.”     
2. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 
Public diplomacy between the United States and Poland was not immune to miss-
steps and blunders.  September 1, 2009, commemorated the 70th anniversary of outbreak 
of World War II.  The absence of President Obama was noticed not only by Poles but 
also by rest of Europe as presented in the following article titled “Poland's 
commemoration in the shadow of the presence” in German paper Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung.  "On September 1 Gdańsk became the "world center" [while hosting] 
commemoration of the beginning of World War II 70 years ago...Barack Obama, Angela 
Merkel, Nicolas Sarkozy, and Vladimir Putin[and many other leaders] – were all 
supposed to come to the ceremony [70th anniversary of the beginning of World War II] . 
Such was the concept. Thus not only to show appreciation of Poland’s role as a 
participant in the war and [its] sacrifice, but also [to acknowledge] its new political 
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position: reconciled with enemies, Russia and Germany, surrounded by its allies, 
protected by America."91  Also the Polish President, Lech Kaczyński declared that: “I 
cannot say that I am happy [about the level of the U.S. delegation].”92  
Perhaps the most significant misstep occurred on March 26, 2012, during a 
summit in Seoul where an unscripted moment between President Obama and Russian 
President Medvedev was captured by camera crews; the American president was 
recorded making a statement: “On all these issues, but particularly missile defense, this, 
this can be solved, but it’s important for him [Vladimir Putin] to give me space…This is 
my last election,” Obama interjects. “After my election, I have more flexibility.”93  Many 
critics interpreted the remark as a promise by President Obama to give in to Russian 
demands once the political danger of doing so during an election campaign had passed.  
Finally, in May 2012, during Medal of Freedom Ceremony for Jan Karski, President 
Obama stated: “Before one trip across enemy lines, resistance fighters told him [Jan 
Karski] that Jews were being murdered on a massive scale and smuggled him into the 
Warsaw Ghetto and a Polish death camp to see for himself.”94  The President referred to 
the concentration camps run by Nazis in Poland during World War II as “Polish death 
camps.”   The entire country of Poland was soon in an uproar, with Polish Prime Minister 
Donald Tusk publicly expressing his outrage in nationally televised remarks: 
“Yesterday’s words by President Obama offended all Poles…We always react the same 
way when ignorance, lack of knowledge, or ill will lead to such distortions of history.”95  
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3. OPEN LETTER TO PRESIDENT OBAMA 
The weakening of the relationship between Poland and the United States caused 
by the above mentioned policies and diplomatic missteps created a negative image of the 
United States in Poland and the region and was best summarized by the open letter to 
President Obama published in one of the major newspapers in Poland, Gazeta Wyborcza 
on July 16, 2009, which was signed by Central and Eastern European intellectuals and 
policy makers under the leadership of Lech Walesa, former leader of Solidarity 
movement and President of Poland, and Vaclav Havel, former Czech President.  The 
main points of the letter stated that the “Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries 
are no longer at the heart of American foreign policy,”  and that abandoning the missile 
defense plan or giving Russia too big a role in it could “undermine the credibility of the 
United States across the whole region.”  The letter is “Praising America’s historic support 
for liberal democratic values, the authors compare the widely different and unfortunate 
outcomes when America stood up for those values and how the region suffered when it 
did not, citing the “reality of Yalta,” a reference to the post-World War II division of 
Europe and the Iron Curtain that descended upon Central and Eastern Europe for nearly 
50 years. If the “realist” view had prevailed in the 1990s, they would not be members of 
NATO or the EU. Similarly, they express the nervousness permeating their capitals today 
warning of their concern that under the Obama administration the United States and the 
major European powers might embrace a new contemporary division embodied in what 
they refer to as the “Medvedev plan for a ‘Concert of Powers’ to replace the continent’s 
existing, value-based security structure.”   The authors conclude their Open Letter with a 
very nuanced but prophetic statement: “We, the authors of this letter, know firsthand how 
important the relationship with the United States has been. In the 1990s, a large part of 
getting Europe right was about getting Central and Eastern Europe right. The engagement 
of the United States was critical to locking in peace and stability from the Baltics to the 
Black Sea. Today the goal must be to keep Central and Eastern Europe right as a stable, 
activist, and Atlanticist part of our broader community.”96  
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4. THE IMPROVEMENT OF POLISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS 
AND THE WAY FORWARD 
Following the open letter the Administration has slowly sought to repair relations 
with Poland and the CEE nations.  President Obama completed in January 2010 the 
initiative begun by President Bush to extend NATO’s Article 5 contingency plans for the 
defense of Poland and Baltic States countries.  He also reestablished the plans for 
creation of somewhat reduced missile defense base in Poland which would protect not 
only the United States but also Poland and other NATO countries.  The United States will 
also create a permanent aviation detachment in Poland which will be augmented with F-
16 and C-130 assets on rotational basis. “The stationing of NATO and U.S. assets in 
Poland has been a long-term goal of successive Polish administrations as a tangible 
demonstration of the U.S.–Polish defense relationship.”97  Although the early policies 
and diplomatic miss-steps of his Administration strained the relationship between the 
United States and Poland, President Obama has an opportunity to repair the relations with 
Warsaw and reaffirm the America’s commitment to Poland, the CEE region and NATO.  
Some of the U.S. initiatives in Poland such as exploration of the potential shale gas fields, 
possible cooperation in the construction of a nuclear power plant, and military 
cooperation and exchange programs are examples of the mending of the Polish-American 
relationship.  
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VIII. DEFENSE EFFORTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS 
ALLIES DURING GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS AND AUSTERITY. 
A. ECONOMIC CRISIS AND NATO 
In 2007, the world financial system endured a near fatal collapse that is 
reminiscent of the stock market crash of 1929. This event quickly left its mark on war 
and peace as well as the European order of states and the trans-Atlantic link. The shadow 
of a depression also had grave implications for the people of central Europe, whose fate 
in the world wars had been tied with the failure of the liberal world order and the rise of 
totalitarianism at their expense.  “The creation of the Organization in NATO under 
Articles, III, IV, V, and IX of the treaty in the years 1949-1954 was guided by the 
principle of thrift and the equitable sharing of the burden under Article III in which 
strictures of economy and savings reigned uppermost even in the attempt to create a 
NATO battle collective defense.”98  Therefore, “austerity has been a constant feature of 
the lives of cabinets, treasuries and general staffs, especially in the leading NATO 
nations, for a very long time in their democratic civil military relations.  It is hardly the 
exception, but more the norm.”99  This global quasi-depression affected all aspects of the 
government in the United States and E.U., including the military spending overstretched 
by the Iraqi and Afghan campaigns as well as a decade of alliance cohesion and burden 
sharing dynamics of questionable merit.  NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen called the financial crisis and the tight budgets it caused the biggest problems 
the alliance will face in coming years”.  During a meeting of NATO defense ministers in 
April 2012 he concluded that: ’We have to set the right priorities, specialize and 
concentrate on what we can do best and what is most urgently needed’”, adding that a 
“’smart defense’ policy was needed to spend money more intelligently…[In one of the 
examples] the military planners put together a list of 20 to 30 top projects they want 
political leaders to sign off on. Another example of ’smart defense’ is the alliance’s 
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European missile defense system. The United States provides the defensive system, 
which Europeans contribute to paying for over the long-term.”100   Retrenchment in 
defense spending is a normal process in episodes, made more telling by the endurance of 
the world financial crisis as well as the more than ten years of high spending in the U.S. 
because of the Iraqi and Afghan campaigns. In the same way, “The decade of the 1990s, 
which began in a recession connected with the 1990-1991 Gulf War,  was a time of 
relative austerity, and it, too, saw fights within the U.S. government and defense 
department over the shape of  budget, strategy, and alliance statecraft in the years leading 
up to 11 September 2001...”101   
B. ECONOMIC CRISIS AND U.S. POLICY ON MISSILE DEFENSE 
The economic crisis in the United States contributed, in part, to the cancellation of 
the Bush-era missile defense program and later on to significant cost-reductions of the 
system to be deployed in European theater.  The expensive development and interceptor 
missiles in the previous system were replaced with less costly missiles based on the U.S. 
Navy SM-3 missiles.  In view of the 2012 NATO summit, “US President Barack Obama 
declared during the Western military alliance’s summit meeting in Chicago that the 
missile shield had an ‘interim capability’.”  The operational first stage of the shield 
consists of a radar facility in Turkey and US ships with anti-missile interceptors in the 
Mediterranean Sea. The command and control center is located in Ramstein, Germany.  
The missile defense shield is scheduled to be fully operational by 2020, with SM-3 
missile facilities to be stationed in Poland and Romania.”102  
Because of the double reversal of the decision regarding deployment of the 
missile defense system in Poland and mixed signals sent by the United States by the 
deployment of “unarmed” Patriot missile batteries to Poland, the Polish President Mr. 
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Komorowski in a magazine interview said: “Our mistake was that by accepting the 
American offer of a shield we failed to take into account the political risk associated with 
a change of president,” and “We paid a high political price. We do not want to make the 
same mistake again. We must have a missile system as an element of our defences.”  
Such a statement reveals the normal process of learning about statecraft that goes with 
alliance membership and echoes insights had by older allies over the decades.103   
“President Komorowski’s call for the creation of Polish missile defense is not about 
Polish-American relations, but about the future of Poland’s security.  Poland needs 
stronger anti-aircraft and anti-short and medium missile defenses independent of any 
proposed American MD system. The two systems are complimentary, not competing.  
The Polish MD system is to be financed from the savings of winding down the war in 
Afghanistan, and from the growth of military budget over the coming years related to 
Poland’s economic growth (Polish law mandates that 1.95 percent of GDP is spent on 
defense). According to initial estimates, it would be a pricy program, costing zł.8 billion 
to zł.15 billion over the next 10 years.”104   
In addition to the missile defense site in Poland, the United States Air Force will 
maintain a small detachment of personnel and rotate F-16 and C-130 aircraft to Poland.  
“Despite the small scale of the U.S. operation, “this is an extremely significant 
development,” said Andrew Michta, senior trans-Atlantic fellow and director of the 
Warsaw office of the German Marshall Fund of the United States.  “This is regarded here 
as mostly a political signal” that the United States “is serious about the security of Poland 
and its neighbors, (the other) NATO allies in the region.”105  This small and less 
expensive solution is the new “lily-pad” type of base that many of the U.S. experts see as 
the future model for the overseas presence.  In addition to the small footprint the U.S. 
forces will be collocated with the host nation’s military forces and share infrastructure, 
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conduct combined training, and operations.  The base requires only a fraction of funding 
comparing to the traditional military installation and it accomplishes the goals of forward 
presence and more important shows the political commitment. 
C. BURDEN SHARING IN TIMES OF AUSTERITY   
“The pooling and sharing of security, defense, military forces and weapons 
symbolizes a plainly urgent and eminently sensible policy.  It is the only real way for the 
future.”106  The uncertain outcomes of the initial economic policies implemented by the 
Obama administration at the beginning of the financial crisis are holding hostage funding 
for many government programs and departments.  The Department of Defense consumes 
the largest portion of the U.S. discretionary budget.107  As the need for austerity and 
reduction in government spending becomes inevitable, proposed cuts place the military at 
the front of future spending reductions.108   Since the United States is the largest single 
contributor, both militarily and financially, to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,109 
the reduction of its budget will significantly reduce NATO’s funding and readiness; 
therefore, the “Smart Defense as outlined by the NATO Secretary General at the Chicago 
Summit this year [2012] plainly indicates the way ahead in the face of diminished 
treasure and the need to employ mutual aid and self-help for the ends of the Alliance.”110  
The disproportion of the contributions was and still is seen by many as the shortcoming 
of the NATO.  The criticism of this imbalance most often originated on the American 
side of the alliance, but lately, some of the Europeans are voicing a similar rhetoric as 
evident in the following statement made by the United Kingdom Defense Secretary, Liam 
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Fox: “When we look at the sometimes pathetic contributions being made by some 
countries inside NATO, the European elements of NATO cannot expect the US to come 
to our aid on every occasion. Far too many of our partners are still trying to get a free ride 
and they should regard Libya as a wake-up call. The U.S. will not always be there to bail 
them out and if they want an insurance policy they should think about paying the 
premium.”111  
D. THE FUTURE 
All of the problems created by the global economic crisis will directly affect the 
future policies and strategy of the American armed forces as well as the NATO alliance.  
The creation of additional overseas bases is hard to justify in this age of austerity.  “Since 
debt debates heated up last summer and with the Pentagon soon to release the details of 
budget reductions, a growing group of prominent politicians across a broad political 
spectrum has called for reducing U.S. military installations and forces overseas to 
produce significant savings.”112  This sentiment is also growing among the general 
population in the United States.  The MDS and U.S. bases in Poland are currently being 
created as planned, but the full implementation of the project is closely tied to economic 
recovery and global security situation. 
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The Polish–American security relationship is based on shared values and common 
interests that nonetheless are embedded within the realities of alliance cohesion and 
international politics.  The present day bilateral relationship is further an expression of 
the place of Poland in the European system of the past and the dictates of burden sharing 
in present, that is, how NATO works.  The latter is a subject arcane even to experts.   In 
this connection, advocates of Polish security remind all critics that Poland was one of the 
four leading countries in the coalition present in Iraq from the outset of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom. More than 2,500 Polish soldiers continue to stand alongside the United States 
and other coalition forces in Afghanistan—significantly, with no national caveats 
imposed by Warsaw.113  As one of the closest allies of the United States, Poland has been 
and still is relying on the bilateral nature of this relationship for legitimacy and 
protection.  Despite being a member of North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Poland is 
seeking additional security assurances and defense cooperation from the United States,  
because of the concerns that the international system of great powers on its borders will 
shift against it. Such fear may well be of greater gravity in the year 2012, granted the 
cosmos of forces at work in Europe and beyond.  
A. SUMMARY 
1. INITIAL PLANS 
After the announcement by the Bush administration in 2007 of plans to create a 
missile defense system in Eastern Europe with an anti-missile interceptor site in Poland 
and later on possibility of additional U.S. military bases on Polish territory, the 
negotiations between Polish and U.S. government began in the final phases of the Bush 
administration and the on the eve of a Russian offensive against NATO enlargement.  
The various aspects of the system, as well as increased in bilateral cooperation between 
United Statesand Poland were discussed.  After the election of Donald Tusk as Prime 
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Minister of Poland on November 9, 2007, the new cabinet insisted on additional 
concessions that included U.S.-made PAC-3 Patriot missile batteries and other 
modernization aspects associated with the advancement of the Polish Armed Forces.  The 
American side was not eager to deploy this expensive weapons system to the Poles and 
instead, after lengthy negotiations, agreed to a rotational presence of U.S. Army PAC-3 
Patriot missile units in Poland and other concessions.  These additional negotiations 
further delayed the signing of the agreement.  Finally, on August 14, 2008 the United 
States and Poland signed a preliminary accord allowing the placement of 10 U.S. 
interceptors on Polish territory.114  In the meantime, the Russian war against Georgia 
marked the climax of NATO enlargement, together with the onset of the global economic 
crisis and the advent of a new administration in the U.S.  Such changes of context and 
policy are the norm in Atlantic security, but such changes proved especially noteworthy 
in the U.S. Polish relation focused on alliance cohesion in the form of anti-missile 
defenses. 
2. THE NEW PLAN 
Delays in negotiations pushed the project very close to the presidential elections 
in the United States.  Additionally, the Polish Sejm (the legislative branch of Polish 
government) did not ratify the agreement until after the election of President Obama.  
With this change, the future of the missile defense system in Eastern Europe became 
uncertain and on September 17, 2009, the Obama administration announced the 
cancellation of the Bush-era MDS and the creation of scaled-down system at a 
significantly later date of 2015-2018.  Later, the creation of a permanent U.S. Air Force 
in Poland with rotations of F-16 and C-130 aircraft was finalized in 2012.    
3. POLICY AND POLITICS 
Despite the great importance assigned to this endeavor by the Polish side no 
changes to the official policy were made by the Polish government for their own reasons. 
None of the national security documents mention any present or future changes in policy, 
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strategy, or tactics caused by the agreement to host this high-tech defensive weapon 
system of the presence of U.S. Air Force personnel and assets within borders of Republic 
of Poland.  The reason for this fact lies outside the analysis of this study, but might well 
be the result of Polish internal politics. 
In lieu of the absence of any policy changes pertaining to the MDS and/or 
American military presence in Poland, one would expect a minimal political significance 
associated with the project or none at all.  However, that would be a very wrong 
assumption about policy and strategy.  The Polish international position in internal 
politics is very cognizant of the U.S. bases in Poland.  Any announcements from the U.S. 
Administration about the MDS and U.S. military bases in Poland are likely to cause a 
debate among political parties, main stream media, and Polish citizens.  The Political 
capital associated with this endeavor is very significant and is often used by both the 
ruling coalition and the opposition in parliamentary debates, TV, radio, and press 
interviews, and political campaigns.   
In part, the changing of positions regarding the future and scope of the project of 
MDS and the U.S. military presence in Poland contributed to the instability of U.S.-
Polish relations.  Scaling back the scope of MDS amidst the criticism of the project by 
Russian leadership combined with the announcement of a “reset” of U.S.-Russia relations 
created a perception of catering to Russia by the Obama Administration. This caused 
further decline of the diplomatic relations and overall rapport between Poland and the 
United States.  .   
4. REACTION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 
The Russian Federation was strongly opposed to missile defense system and 
placement of U.S. troops in Eastern Europe and especially on territory of Poland.  The 
announcement of the establishment of the MDS site and U.S. military base(s) in Poland 
triggered criticism among Russian politicians and military leaders with strongest 
statement coming from the Russian Federation’s senior military commander, General 
Nikolai Makarov, who insinuated the possibility of the use of destructive pre-emptive 
action in the event of a worsening situation pertaining to missiles and the deployment of 
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short-range Iskander missiles in the Russian Kaliningrad exclave near Poland, possibly 
creating the worst military tensions since the Cold War.  The assurances of the purely 
defensive-nature of the missile defense system by both United States and NATO eased 
some of the tensions between these former Cold War adversaries.  Nevertheless, the 
subject of missile defense system and American military bases in Poland is a “live-wire” 
in the Polish-Russian and American-Russian relations. 
5. THE WAY FORWARD 
The political and diplomatic difficulties in securing the existence of MDS and 
U.S. military bases in Poland were only exasperated by the global economic and financial 
crisis.  The deteriorating economic situation in the United States and around the world 
put additional financial, political, and policy strain on the MDS and creation of another 
overseas base in Poland.  As the domestic economic situation worsened the justification 
for this expensive project became harder.  However, revisions to the plan made it more 
affordable while achieving the desire political, military, and diplomatic goals.  The 
expansion of the area protected by modified missile defense system to all NATO-member 
countries further contributed to the support of the system both in the U.S. and in Europe.   
Despite the increasing difficulties between the two allies and some public 
diplomacy missteps on the American side, the Polish government has fulfilled its 
commitment to the U.S. and NATO in Afghanistan and in other areas.  As time passed 
and both sides continued the dialogue, the diplomatic situation has improved and the 
relationship is moving in a similar direction.  The initial actions taken by the Obama 
administration to further improve the relationship were, in the wake of the Caucasus war 
in 2008, the completion of the NATO’s Article 5 collective defense clause to include 
defense of Poland and other Baltic states; followed by the creation of U.S. Air Force 
detachment in Poland, and the reaffirmation of the creation of the MDS site.  Those were 
soon followed by other initiatives such as the exploration of potential shale gas fields, 
possible cooperation in the construction of a nuclear power plant, and military 
cooperation and exchanges. The improvement of the relationship between Poland and the 
United States signifies the ongoing realities of alliance cohesion and burden sharing, a 
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process that will take some time to reach the level it once had, but a process well worth 
the effort to strengthen a bilateral security bond that helps assure peace and freedom for 
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